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 The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Times change, and often, when they do, the law must change as 
well.  This is an issue that has typically been overlooked in our legal 
system, a system that is based on precedent with limited means for adjusting 
that precedent and no clear avenue for judicial updating of the law.  Courts 
typically overturn or distinguish precedent, they may even modify it, but 
they rarely declare that prior law no longer fits current conditions.  In other 
words, a Court rarely proclaims something to the effect of, “That was then, 
this is now.”  Rather, when statutes become outdated courts often wait for 
Congress to alter the statute rather than changing past precedent to conform 
to the changed conditions.1 
 
 Employment discrimination law has long been ripe for updating.  
Many of the core cases regarding how discrimination is defined and proved 
arose in the 1970s in a very different era and were designed to address very 
different kinds of discrimination.  Those early cases came on the heels of 
the Civil Rights movement, when overt discrimination and segregated 
workforces were the norm, and when men and women were routinely 
considered to have different abilities and interests.  Equally clear, those 
early cases  invariably dealt with the remnants of overt segregation.  To take 
a prime example, the well-known disparate impact case of Griggs v. Duke 
Power Company involved employment practices that were adopted the day 
                                                 
∗  Samuel Tyler Research Professor, George Washington University Law School.  
Versions of this paper have been presented at a number of conferences and law school 
workshops where I have received valuable comments.  I am particularly indebted to the 
comments and conversations of Sam Bagenstos, Donald Braman, Roberto Corrado, 
Melissa Hart, Deborah Hellman, Rona Kitchen, Maria Ontiveros, Wendy Parker, George 
Rutherglen,  Vicki Schultz, Charlie Sullivan, and many others.  I have also benefitted by 
the research assistance of Michelle O’Meara and Sylvia Tsakos.    
1  One area where the Court has been moving to adjust a statute to contemporary 
conditions is with the Voting Rights Act, where the Supreme Court recently invalidated a 
requirement that certain jurisdictions with a detailed history of discrimination had to seek 
federal government approval for voting rights changes   See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 
S.Ct. 2612 (2013).  An important part of the Court’s determination was that the rules that 
governed jurisdictions based on discrimination from the 1960s and 1970s no longer had the 
same relevancy.  See id. at 2625 (noting that “Nearly 50 years [after Voting Rights Act was 
passed], things have changed dramatically” and proceeding to document those changes).     
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2430378 
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the 1964 Civil Rights Act became effective by an employer that had 
previously confined African Americans to its least desirable jobs.2  Yet, the 
law that was established in Griggs remains, with slight modifications, the 
same today even though the conditions that motivated the Court to create 
the disparate impact cause of action have clearly changed.3  In light of the 
progress our society has made, one can reasonably ask whether a practice 
that is facially neutral but has discriminatory effects should be treated as 
discrimination today, whether the justification for doing so remains the 
same today as it was forty years ago.  The answer to that question may very 
well be yes but neither Congress nor the Court has had an open discussion 
regarding the relevance of the disparate impact theory for contemporary 
society, though as will be discussed in detail below, the Supreme Court has 
recently and implicitly answered the question in the negative.      
 
 Indeed, over the last few years the Supreme Court has taken notice 
of the way social conditions have changed and it has begun a deliberate, but 
unannounced, revamping of existing case law.  During this time period, the 
Supreme Court has decided four important employment discrimination 
cases that all resembled claims from an earlier era and it has decidedly 
rejected the old models of proof and has done so without overturning a 
single case.4  In each of the recent cases, the Supreme Court has rejected 
some of the earlier doctrine, whether that has to do with the relevance of the 
disparate impact theory, the power of rudimentary statistical analysis to 
establish class claims of intentional discrimination, or the fear of retaliation 
that might prevent someone from complaining, but it has done so without 
directly confronting the ill-fit between the aged case law and the changing 
nature of discrimination.  With one important exception, Congress has 
remained on the sidelines in this deliberate doctrinal transformation.5             
 
 Discrimination law is different from other areas of the law such as 
                                                 
2  401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
3  Today the disparate impact section is codified as part of Title VII, and the statutory 
standards are quite similar to what was originally established in the Griggs case and later 
amplified by a second case, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).  The 
statutory provision was added as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and can be found at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).    
4  The four cases are Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); 
AT&T v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009); Ricci v. DeStefano,  557 U.S. 557 (2009) and 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2451 (2011).    
5  The exception was the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, which 
repudiated the Supreme Court’s Ledbetter decision.  See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as mended 42 U.S.C. § 200e & 29 U.S.C. § 
626, 2001).       
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contracts or torts, or even constitutional law in that there has long been an 
assumption that one purpose of the Civil Rights laws was to substantially 
reduce the amount of discrimination that exists in our society.  The law was 
designed to do more than just resolve inevitable disputes; the law was 
intended to alter social conditions, and once that purpose was satisfied, the 
law would need to adapt to the new situation.  Most scholars in the area, 
myself included, firmly believe that the purpose of reducing discrimination 
has not yet been fully realized but it would be difficult to contend that the 
prevalence of discrimination has not receded.  This is one issue on which 
many liberal commentators have been less influential than they might have 
otherwise been because their work can be interpreted to suggest that 
discrimination has not receded but,  in fact, has become even more 
pervasive.6  Yet, in charting a future doctrinal path, it is crucial to 
acknowledge the dramatic decrease in discrimination from the early years of 
antidiscrimination law, and the real question for courts and commentators is 
how the changing nature and extent of discrimination should be reflected in 
contemporary antidiscrimination law.   
 
The Supreme Court’s answer to this question has been wholly 
unsatisfactory.  The Court has largely rejected the continuing relevance of 
the disparate impact doctrine and statistical proof of discrimination, 
presumably under the notion that neither is relevant to contemporary 
discrimination.  While it may have made sense to look at an employer’s 
workforce in the 1970s and proclaim that the underrepresentation of women 
or minorities was the product of discrimination, that conclusion no longer 
holds force.  Today when the Supreme Court looks at an imbalanced 
workforce, like the one that was at issue in the recent Wal-Mart class action 
litigation, it is likely to shrug its shoulders before proclaiming that it does 
not know what accounts for the composition of the workforce.7  
                                                 
6  Among legal scholarships, there are two groups who seem to emphasize that 
discrimination has changed rather than receded.  One group concentrates on the 
institutional nature of discrimination, the way in which discrimination seeps into 
organizations or societies.  See, e.g., Ian Haney Lopez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1779 (2012); Tristin Green, A Structural Approach to Andiscrimination Mandate: 
Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VANDERBILT L. REV. 849 (2007); Trristin Green, 
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate 
Treatment Theory, 38 HARVARD CIV. RIGHTS – CIV. LIB. L. REV. 91 (2003).  The other 
group are those scholars who tout the importance of the Implicit Association Test as an 
indicator of discrimination.  See, e.g., Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of 
Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE L. REV. 795 
(2012); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 
(2010).  The issue of implicit bias is taken up in section IV.A, and I will discuss the 
institutional discrimination thesis (much of which I agree with) in section IV.B.2.      
7  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2451 (2011), discussed infra at 
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Discrimination is no longer seen as the default explanation.  In a similar 
vein, when employees come to the Court to complain about the continuing 
effects of discrimination that occurred many years earlier, the Court is 
likely to be  entirely dismissive of the notion that there is any need for 
remedial action and it is more likely to criticize employees for not 
complaining sooner.8  And when employees complain about the disparate 
effects of examination results, the Court is more likely to see those results 
as the product of merit rather than discrimination.9 
 
This, however, is not the unsatisfactory part of the doctrine, indeed, 
I believe the Court is largely correct to conclude that the kind of proof, or 
actions, that constituted discrimination forty years ago no longer have broad 
application to claims of contemporary discrimination.  What is disturbing 
about the Court’s recent decisions is what it has left in its wake.  Although 
it is certainly true that discrimination has sharply receded since the 1970s, it 
is also true that the discrimination that remains has changed in character, 
becoming more subtle, more entrenched, and more systemic in nature, 
which in turn means more difficult to identify or prove.  This has been the 
unequivocal message of virtually all of the research conducted over the last 
two decades in a variety of fields and is also a common mantra among those 
who delve into the complexity of contemporary discrimination, including 
on occasion, the Supreme Court.10  Yet, the Court has not modified the case 
law to take into account the changed nature of discrimination but instead 
remains tied to doctrinal methods of proof that largely fail to capture more 
subtle forms of discrimination.  The primary message arising out of the 
Supreme Court is that discrimination has receded not that it has changed.  
And while the Court is shedding some of its older doctrines, it remains 
                                                                                                                            
section III.D.  
8  See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), discussed infra 
at section III.A. 
9  See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), discussed infra section III.C. 
10  For a sampling of important work in this area see IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE 
PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001); 
NANCY DITOMASO, THE AMERICAN NON-DILEMMA: RACIAL INEQUALITY WITHOUT 
RACISM (2013); GLENN LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002); CECILIA 
RIDGEWAY, FRAMED BY GENDER: HOW GENDER INEQUALITY PERSISTS IN THE MODERN 
WORLD (2011); VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 
(1998); John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J. 
SOC. ISSUES 829 (2001).   It bears emphasizing that the changed nature of discrimination is 
not a new concept.  See, e.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, eds., PREJUDICE, 
DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM (1986) (discussing new theories of discrimination including 
modern and aversive racism).  The Supreme Court has been most attentive to issues of 
subtle discrimination in the area of criminal law.  See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 
472 (2005) (rejecting as implausible a race-neutral explanation for striking juror).  
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mired in a limited and old-fashioned mindset when it comes to identifying 
or defining discrimination, a mindset that continues to see discrimination as 
the product of isolated and aberrational bad actors.  We are thus left with a 
large gap between what we know about contemporary discrimination and 
the ability of antidiscrimination law to identify that discrimination, and in 
the Court’s view, reducing discrimination further will primarily occur as a 
result of the self-interests of employers.             
 
This article will proceed as follows.  The next section will detail the 
evolution of the doctrine in the 1970s and explain how most of the doctrine 
arose from cases of easily identifiable and overt exclusions.  From there, I 
focus on four recent Supreme Court decisions to demonstrate the Court’s 
rejection of the past doctrine, particularly with respect to recent cases 
seeking to challenge systemic discrimination. Those cases all could have 
emerged straight from central casting in the 1970s and the Court’s recent 
decisions indicate that what constituted discrimination in that earlier era 
will may no longer be seen as discrimination today.  Section IV turns to an 
exploration of how discrimination has changed, how it has become more 
subtle and complex over time, and also how the Supreme Court has, or 
more specifically, has not adapted to the evolving nature of discrimination.  
This has been particularly true of systemic claims of discrimination where 
the Supreme Court seems wedded to a vision that only sees discrimination 
in the most blatant circumstances and is unable to identify patterns of 
discrimination when it is necessary to draw inferences of discrimination.  In 
this last section I will also critique the current academic obsession with 
what is known as implicit bias and call instead for better ways to illustrate 
the subtlety and complexity of contemporary discrimination.             
 
II.  THE 1970S AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE. 
 
     A.  The Origins of Employment Discrimination Law. 
 
 Title VII – the primary federal antidiscrimination law that targets 
employment -- was passed in 1964, became effective for private employers 
the following year and seven years later to public employers, and the statute 
immediately generated substantial case law and controversy.  The 
Department of Justice, which had primary enforcement authority at the 
time, quickly filed lawsuits against several large unions and later targeted 
police and fire departments for their discriminatory practices, particularly 
their use of written examinations that adversely affected minority 
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applicants.11  The NAACP Legal Defense Fund “(LDF”), in conjunction 
with a small North Carolina law firm, brought suit against major North 
Carolina employers, and many of the efforts of LDF and the Justice 
Department resulted in the important early Supreme Court cases.12   
 
 These cases were all of their era – filed in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the lawsuits targeted entrenched patterns of discrimination typically 
against employers with a history of overt exclusion, and the cases raised 
some difficult issues that have now largely been forgotten, both in 
casebooks and our legal imagination.  For example, a number of the cases 
raised the issue of whether an employer was responsible for remedying its 
past discriminatory practices.   Many of the cases involved seniority 
systems and the workforce imbalance that originated when discrimination 
was lawful, and in these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the 
employer had no obligation to remedy those past practices.13  A decade later 
the Court would revisit the issue in a pay discrimination case – a case 
originally filed immediately after the statute became applicable to public 
employers – where past discriminatory pay decisions had a continuing 
effect on current pay.14  In that case, the Supreme Court, unanimously, held 
that the employer had a duty to remedy its past discrimination so long as an 
employee’s current salary was affected.15  It is not entirely clear why the 
Supreme Court shifted gears when it came to pay discrimination, but it is 
certainly easier to remedy pay inequities than to uproot past hiring or 
promotion decisions, and it may also be that the Court was concerned that 
the pay inequities had not been remedied in the dozen years since the Act 
had been passed.16   
                                                 
11   See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (suing union for 
discrimination among drivers); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local 
Union No. 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).   See also United States v. City of Chicago, 
385 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (police); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 371 
F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (police that included Justice Department involvement).   
12   A number of seminal Supreme Court cases arose from North Carolina, in part 
because of an active law firm that brought many of the cases in conjunction with the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.  See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 
U.S. 405 (1975) (North Carolina paper company sued for discriminatory tests); Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (North Carolina energy company sued for 
discriminatory tests);  Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
(Charlotte North Carolina desegregation case involving mandatory busing). 
13 See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353 (1977) (no obligation to remedy 
effects of legitimate seniority system implemented prior to Act’s effective date despite its 
discriminatory nature).    
14 Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986). 
15 Id. at 392. 
16  To make the issue more concrete:  In Bazemore the state of North Carolina had paid 
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 The famous case of Duke Power Company v. Griggs also fits the 
model described above.  Duke Power, a large North Carolina energy 
company, had limited the employment opportunities of African Americans 
to its worst jobs until the day Title VII became effective.  Thereafter, the 
employer required its employees to pass two written examinations in order 
to move out of those jobs.17  Whether or not the examinations were 
instituted with an intent to discriminate, there was little question that the 
effect of the examinations would be to perpetuate the company’s segregated 
workforce, to leave things the way they had been, and the Court concluded 
that such a pattern would be contrary to the purpose behind Title VII.18 
Although in Griggs, the Court did not require the employer to remedy its 
past practices, it did require them to take steps to move away from a fully 
segregated workforce through what became known as the disparate impact 
theory.  The important novelty of the case was that plaintiffs could establish 
a claim of discrimination without the burdensome need to prove an intent to 
discriminate.19  Discriminatory results and the lack of an adequate 
justification was sufficient to prevail on a claim, and likewise was defined 
as unlawful discrimination.      
 
 These cases highlight how the Supreme Court was creating law 
against a particular historical backdrop, a backdrop of pervasive and overt 
exclusionary practices.  As a statute, Title VII is notoriously short-winded 
so it was necessary for the Court to give meaning to the particular 
provisions and it did so primarily by emphasizing the purpose behind the 
statute, which was to end the segregated practices but with a minimal 
amount of disruption among existing employees.20     
 
                                                                                                                            
its African-American extension agents less than its white agents until Title VII forbade 
such practices.  Thereafter, the question was whether the state had an obligation to 
eliminate those past disparities rather than just moving forward with equal pay scales or 
salary increases.  Id. at 394.  With the seniority systems, the question was whether an 
employer was obligated to disrupt the seniority system that preexisted Title VII where only 
whites typically had access, and accrued seniority, for the most desirable jobs.       
17 401 U.S. at 427-28. 
18  Id. at 436.  One reason for this was, as the Court noted, the discriminatory and 
deficient education that had been provided to African Americans within North Carolina.  
Id. at 430 (“Because they are Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education in 
segregated schools . . .”).  
19 401 U.S. at 429. 
20 This is where the seniority cases came in.  Although there was little question that 
white individuals, almost always white men, had benefited by past discriminatory practices, 
the Court determined it was too late to disrupt their employment and thus focused on 
prospective changes.  Teamsters, 431 U.S. at  379. 
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 Other cases that arose at the time also involved explicit 
discriminatory practices and the perpetuation of past discrimination.  The 
explicit cases typically involved gender restrictions and the very first case 
that arose under Title VII struck down an employer’s refusal to hire women 
with children, a variant of a similar case that had arisen under an entirely 
different statute.21  Another early case restricted the employment 
opportunities of women  who sought to work in male prisons,22 and the 
Court also considered the permissibility of an employer’s practice of hiring 
by word of mouth for its construction jobs.   
 
This latter case, Furnco v. Waters, raised a number of thorny issues 
that had befuddled the lower courts.23  There were two related questions 
present in the case  – could employers use word-of-mouth recruiting, was 
such a practice lawful, and in addition, the case also raised the question 
whether an employer should be required to use employment practices that 
would maximize opportunities for minority workers.24  As anachronistic as 
it may seem today, the Court of Appeals had held that the employer must 
adopt the practice that would best open up positions for minority workers, a 
conclusion the Supreme Court ultimately rejected, while also holding that 
word-of-mouth, or subjective decisionmaking, was not a per se violation of 
Title VII.25   In Furnco, and as was true in Griggs and the gender cases, we 
see the Court making judgments about what kinds of practices were 
permissible, what kinds of practices the new statute was designed to 
eradicate.  At the same time, the Supreme Court tempered the law’s 
development by holding only that employers refrain from discriminating 
rather than being required to hire more minority workers.     
 
During the same Term as the Furnco case was decided, the Supreme 
Court addressed two cases that raised issues regarding the role of statistics 
in proving claims of discrimination.  Although it is now widely accepted 
that statistics are an essential tool for proving class action claims, these 
                                                 
21 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (1971).  The famous case of Monell v. 
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which permitted suits under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, involved a New York City policy of requiring pregnant women to take unpaid 
leave.  
22  Dothard. v. Rawlilnson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).  
23  The Furnco case involved an employer’s practice of hiring only bricklayers who the 
Plant Superintendent knew or were referred to him, which resulted in a nearly all-white 
group of bricklayers.  See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 571 (1978).  
24  Id. at 577. 
25  Id. at 578 (noting that the employer is not required to adopt practices that will 
maximize opportunities for minority workers) and 580 n.9 (rejecting challenge to 
subjective practices as discriminatory) .  
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early cases raised the question whether statistics could be relied on to prove 
an intent to discriminate.  Here the Court was addressing in a class action 
context the very same issue it had previously addressed in an individual 
case – under what circumstances should courts draw inferences of 
discrimination?26   The two cases involving the use of statistics were similar 
in nature and both were brought by the Department of Justice.  In the 
Teamsters case, no African- Americans held the most prestigious job of 
long-distance driver, even though about five percent of the company’s 
workforce was African American.27  The second case involved  a suburb 
just outside St. Louis, where there were very few African-American 
teachers, even though just over fifteen percent of the teachers in the City of 
St. Louis were African American.28   Both cases presented strong grounds 
for identifying discrimination as a cause of the workplace imbalances 
because both defendants had a long and open history of excluding African 
Americans.29  Both cases were also a product of their time, as they 
presented questions of the employer’s duty to remedy past discrimination, 
one in the form of a seniority system and the other in the form of a deeply 
imbalanced workforce that experienced relatively little turnover.  
 
Most important to the development of the law, the cases involved 
the use of statistics to establish an intent to discriminate, and both relied on 
relatively unsophisticated statistical claims.  The question posed in both 
cases was whether discrimination could be defined as the cause of the 
workforce imbalance.  Put more directly, why were there no African 
Americans among the long-haul truck drivers, even while there were a 
significant number who worked the shorter routes?  Similarly, why were 
there so few African-American teachers in Hazelwood, particularly when 
many qualified African- American teachers were working nearby in the City 
of St. Louis?   Statistics came into play by demonstrating that the workforce 
compositions were not likely a chance occurrence – when the numbers were 
so stark, statistical analysis could rule out chance as a likely cause and at 
this point in time, courts were willing to assume discrimination was, 
therefore, a likely cause. Neither case involved extensive analysis of 
                                                 
26  In the context of individual claims, the case is McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
27   Id. at 337.   
28   Id. at 303.    
29 For example, in Hazelwood the Court noted that Hazelwood hired its first African-
American teacher in 1969, and by 1973 22 of the 1231 (or 1.7%) were African Americans.  
In contrast, of the 19,000 teachers employed in the St. Louis area, 15.4% were African 
American.  Id.  In Teamsters, the government “bolstered its statistical evidence with the 
testimony of individuals who recounted 40 specific instances of discrimination.”  
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 439. 
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statistics, and both borrowed loosely from an earlier case that addressed the 
same issue but in the context of a jury composition – namely at what point 
could we assume the absence of African Americans in a jury pool was the 
product of discrimination. 30    
 
These last three cases represented important statements by the Court 
regarding employers’ obligation to remedy past discrimination, and also in 
the way the Court would define discrimination moving forward.  Statistics 
could plainly establish an inference of discrimination but at the same time, 
an employer had no obligation to uproot existing employees or to adopt 
practices that would most clearly benefit African Americans.  An employer, 
for example, might argue that it had so few African-American teachers 
because it had previously discriminated against them when it was allowed 
to do so and it simply had not done enough hiring to change that balance.  
An employer might also argue that too few African Americans were 
qualified for the positions or were not interested in them and it soon turned 
out that many courts were relatively quick to accept such explanations.  
Indeed, after establishing the broad parameters for proving discrimination, 
the Supreme Court began to pull back from its broad protective stance by 
noting, what has now become talismanic in employment law, “Courts are 
generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices 
and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it.”31    
 
While the Court was developing Title VII law, it also began to 
confront the complicated issue of affirmative action.  The well-known 
Bakke case32 was decided the same year as Furnco, and shortly thereafter 
the Court addressed two affirmative action cases that arose under Title VII.  
Both of those cases were essentially identical to the Teamsters case in that 
unions had been sued for their history of discrimination.  The main 
difference was that the Title VII affirmative action cases involved remedial 
questions, and the law of affirmative action became divided between claims 
that were designed to remedy past discrimination and the diversity 
justification that was ultimately established in Bakke.33  Employers, the 
                                                 
30  In conducting a rudimentary statistical analysis, the Court borrowed from its very 
recent precedent in a jury discrimination case.  See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 
(1977).  In that case, the Court employed a standard deviation analysis to determine 
whether the observed disparities might be attributable to chance or whether something else, 
such as discrimination, likely explained those disparities.  The Court performed the same 
analysis in Hazelwood.  See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 311 n.58.     
31 Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578. 
32 Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
33 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding private 
affirmative action program that was designed to address past practice that had largely 
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Supreme Court concluded, could administer affirmative action programs, 
even ones that contained quotas, so long as the programs were designed to 
remedy past or present discrimination.34 Without a remedial justification, 
entities, and this became relevant primarily for educational entities, could 
use race as a factor in its decisions so as to provide greater diversity to a 
class, and an employer might also be able to use gender, the Court later 
said, to address a manifest imbalance in its workforce.35   
 
By the end of its first decade interpreting Title VII, half of the 
Court’s decisions, and all of the large class action cases, involved 
employers with a demonstrated history of discrimination.  Even though 
some of the cases, like Griggs, involved the creation of substantive law, a 
central question in all of the cases involved a mandate to prevent the 
perpetuation of past practices and the discrimination that flowed from those 
practices.  This was a slightly different question from whether employers 
had an obligation to remedy those past practices but it was clear the Court 
was trying to steer the law into a different era.  And by the end of the 
decade that different era seemed to have arrived.  The affirmative action 
cases presented an important but underappreciated change in direction:  
within ten short years the Court had gone from focusing on employers with 
a clear history of discrimination to employers, and educational entities, that 
sought to take voluntary action to diversity the workplace or student body.  
From this perspective, the interests of employers were becoming more 
aligned with racial minorities and women, and the concern for judicial 
supervision switched from employers who were discriminating to 
employers who were seeking to benefit women and minorities at the 
expense of white employees.   
 
Not only was the Court grappling with the divisive issue of 
                                                                                                                            
excluded African Americans from certain positions).  Another case arose a few years later 
in which the Court upheld an affirmative action plan that a court had imposed upon a union 
to remedy past discrimination and the union’s refusal to address its discrimination.  See 
Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).   
34  In Weber, the Supreme Court upheld a voluntarily-implemented affirmative action 
program that was designed to address a racial imbalance in the workforce.  One aspect of 
the case that is often overlooked is that the imbalance was the direct result of the overt 
exclusion of African-Americans from craft positions.  See 443 U.S. at 198.  In footnote one 
of its Opinion, the Court listed many findings of overt exclusion.  See id. at  n.1.   The 
Sheet Metal Workers case involved a judicially imposed affirmative-action plan designed 
to remedy a lengthy, and judicially determined, history of discrimination against African 
Americans.  See Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 428-40 (describing the history). 
35 See Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) 
(upholding a voluntary affirmative plan designed to address a significant gender imbalance 
in the workforce).  
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affirmative action but it also was addressing the even more controversial 
issue of school busing as a means of remedying our segregated past.  
Although the Court gave a rather broad imprimatur to busing as a remedial 
measure at the beginning of the decade,36 by the middle it had signaled a 
major change by limiting the power of school districts to breach district 
lines to integrate schools, giving force to what came to be called white 
flight.37  Indeed, by the end of the decade, the very concept of 
discrimination had changed as had the Court’s fidelity to broad remedial 
measures to address discrimination.38      
 
The most important insight to be drawn from the cases is that they 
were borne of an era, and none of the cases, including Griggs, produced any 
detailed discussion of how discrimination was to be proved or identified.  
Most of the cases were not complicated and all involved stark exclusions:  
in Griggs, African Americans were confined to the laborer jobs, in 
Teamsters there were no African-American long distance drivers; in 
Hazelwood, there were strikingly few African-American teachers; in 
Furnco, there were no black bricklayers; in the gender cases, there were no 
pregnant teachers and no women working in male prisons or as construction 
dispatchers.  As a result, because the cases were so clear, the Court 
provided broad pronouncements about what kinds of acts were or were not 
discriminatory, often in potentially contradictory form.  For example, while 
the Supreme Court held that workforce underrepresentation, by itself, was 
not evidence of discrimination, strong statistical proof could establish an 
intent to discriminate.39  In making these pronouncements, the Court failed 
to recognize that the statistical proof involved little more than documenting 
underrepresentation in the workforce, and it would be another thirty years 
before the Court sought to reconcile those contradictory impulses.40          
                                                 
36 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) 
(upholding busing plan to address segregation).   
37 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (striking down a busing plan that 
crossed school district boundaries).    
38  In addition to the cases discussed above, this was signaled in the important case of  
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), in which the Court upheld the use 
of veteran’s preferences against a constitutional gender discrimination challenge.  Notably, 
in that case the Court held that an “awareness of  [the] consequences” of an act is not the 
same as purposeful discrimination.  Id. at 279.   The Supreme Court also upheld a policy, 
against a disparate impact challenge, that prohibited the hiring of drug users, including 
those who were using methadone.  See New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 
U.S. 568 (1979).    
39 Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08 (“Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, 
they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of 
discrimination.”). 
40  Many of the early cases, including Teamsters, Hazelwood, Griggs, Furnco, Sheet 
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B.  The Political Backlash of the 1980s. 
 
  By the end of the seventies, the Court had come full circle, from an 
acknowledgement that discrimination was pervasive and needed to be 
remedied to a modest questioning of the relevance of the antidiscrimination 
laws with a concern that employers were now going too far in their efforts 
to address past discrimination.  That modest questioning would take a 
serious skeptical turn in the nineteen eighties when the Supreme Court 
adopted the distinctly conservative political views that were in vogue at the 
time.  For a variety of reasons, this period has little to do with the 
contemporary doctrine so I will only spend a brief time discussing the 
Court’s hostile turn, which really began in the early 1980s but picked up 
speed with the addition of Justice Scalia to the Supreme Court in the mid-
1980s.41 
 
 With the passage of time, it is easy to forget the powerful influence 
President Ronald Reagan had on the courts and more broadly, on the role 
the courts should play in modern life or in fomenting social change.  The 
Reagan Revolution was premised in significant part on creating a more 
limited role for the courts, and it was also distinctly hostile to the civil rights 
legacy.  Opposition to affirmative action was a central tenet of the 
administration’s policies and it quickly set out to refashion the judiciary and 
civil rights enforcement.42  The Reagan Administration appointed decidedly 
conservative and often high profile individuals to the federal courts to an 
extent that seems unthinkable today.  These included the well-known 
conservative scholars Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook from the 
University of Chicago, as well as Robert Bork but also included Edith Jones 
and Patrick Higginbotham to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and very 
young judges such as Alex Kozinski and Diarmud O’Scannloin to the Ninth 
Circuit of Appeals.  Likely the most important appointment was the 
                                                                                                                            
Metal Workers, Weber, were primarily focused on statistical imbalances in the workforce.  
The Court did not return to the issue until the recent Wal-Mart case, dicussed infra ___.    
41  Justice Scalia joined the Court for the Term that began in October 1986 and within 
six months, in his very first case involving employment issues, he issued a stinging dissent 
on a gender discrimination affirmative action case.  See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 
Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
42 For discussions of the approach of the Reagan Administration see NORMAN C. 
AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1988); RAYMOND WOLTERS, 
RIGHT TURN, WILLIAM BRADFORD REYNOLDS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK 
CIVIL RIGHTS (1996).  A more recent and excellent reflection on the era is DANIEL T. 
RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE (2011).    
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placement of now Justice Antonin Scalia on the D.C. Circuit.43   
 
 The appointment of Justice Scalia to the Supreme Court marked the 
highwater moment for the conservative revolution and also began the 
intensive reconsideration of settled antidiscrimination doctrine.  In the mid-
1980s, the Supreme Court began to issue what became a series of highly 
controversial and hostile civil rights decisions, many of which modified or 
overturned prior decisions.44  The attack by the Court was relentless and 
largely embodied the political views of the Republican party, which saw the 
civil rights era as having evolved into a racial entitlement program.  
Although the Court was unsuccessful in eliminating affirmative action,45 it 
did manage to cut at the margins, particularly with the various contract set-
aside programs that existed at the time.46  It also significantly revised the 
law governing educational desegregation in what might be described as the 
beginning of a wind down period.47 
 
 When it came to employment discrimination law, the Supreme 
Court set its sights on the disparate impact theory, and sought to restrict the 
force of that doctrine through the highly controversial decision of Wards 
Cove v. Atonio.48  The disparate impact doctrine had always been high on 
                                                 
43  Much has been written about President Reagan’s effort to transform the judiciary in 
his conservative image.  See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE 
CONSTItution 220-22 (1990); Sheldon Goldman, Reagan’s Judicial Legacy: Completing 
the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318 (1988-89); Walter F. Murphy, Reagan’s 
Judicial Strategy, in LOOKING BACK ON THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY (L. Berman ed., 1990). 
44  Many of the cases involved issues relating to employment discrimination and were 
largely overturned by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  The major cases were:  
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (limiting scope of section 1981); 
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting collateral attacks on consent decrees); 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 641 (1989) (altering and tightening the 
standards for proving disparate impact claim).      
45 The Supreme Court took up several cases in the 1980s that seemed to have the 
potential to sharply limit the use of affirmative action but most of the cases fizzled.  See 
Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (upholding consent decree that allowed 
relief for individuals who were not actual victims of the challenged discriminatory 
practices); Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (reversing court injunction 
preventing the use of seniority-based layoffs as inconsistent with consent decree).    
46 See Adarand Constr. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to federal 
set-aside program and rejecting prior case establishing lower standard of review); City of 
Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to strike down local set-
aside program).  
47 See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (permitting incremental release from 
consent orders even though jurisdiction had not obtained full compliance); Board of 
Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (allowing jurisdiction to be released from court 
supervision when it obtained desegregation “to the extent practicable”). 
48 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
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the conservative list of targets because it was widely associated with 
affirmative action.  Because the disparate impact doctrine did not require 
proof of intent and largely turned on establishing statistical disparities in a 
workforce, one way for employers to avoid disparate impact lawsuits, the 
argument went, was to hire by the numbers.49  This was a crude but 
influential interpretation of the doctrine and in the Wards Cove case, the 
Court sought to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed on such 
claims on two different levels.  The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
statistical analysis and also shifted the burden of proof to plaintiffs on a 
critical element of the proof structure.50   
 
 At the time, all of this was incredibly important and could have 
altered the doctrine significantly.  But the Court ultimately overplayed its 
hand and Congress stepped in almost immediately after the Wards Cove 
decision was issued to address the litany of cases the Court had issued that 
were hostile to employment discrimination plaintiffs.  It took two years but 
Congress ultimately passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“CRA 1991”), a 
statute that was designed to overturn or modify seven Supreme Court 
decisions.51  This was a powerful and influential rebuke of the Supreme 
Court, and as I have commented elsewhere, the statute seemed to restrain 
the Supreme Court for nearly two decades.52  Following the CRA 1991, the 
Supreme Court moved cautiously and plaintiffs fared much better in the 
cases that came before the Court, with an important exception.  While in the 
late 1980s, the plaintiffs failed on virtually all of their cases, after the CRA 
1991 plaintiffs prevailed in the majority of cases other than those that 
                                                 
49  This was a standard argument raised at the time and one that was used to challenge 
both the Civil Rights Act of 1990 (vetoed) and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (passed).  
Indeed, President Bush’s veto message for the 1990 Act included a reference to the quota 
issue.  See Steven A. Holmes, President Vetoes Bill on Job Rights; Showdown is Set, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990, at A1 (quoting veto message as stating that the bill “employs a 
message of highly legalistic language to introduce the desctructive forces of quotas into our 
national employment system.”).  See also CHARLES FRIED, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: 
ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION – A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 119 (1991) (explaining role 
of quotas in opposition to legislation).  
50  See Wards Cove Packing Co v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).  The Court’s 
reasoning on the statistical analysis, namely that the plaintiffs relied on an unrefined 
statistical analysis that failed to account for necessary job qualifications, remains the law 
today and was not a significant departure from prior law.  See id. at 654.  The shifting of 
the burden of proof was a major change in the law and ultimately overturned by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.  See id. at 660. 
51  See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
52  See Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court’s Surprising and Strategic Response to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 281 (2011) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s reaction to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
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touched on substantial political issues.53   
                                       
     It is important, however, to explain the difference between the 
hostility of the Supreme Court in the 1980s and its more recent judicial 
reconsideration of the doctrine.  In the 1980s, Supreme Court’s decisions 
seemed decidedly political in nature, and did not appear to be in response to 
a substantial decrease in discrimination.  Indeed, some of the hostile 
decisions were issued within half a dozen years of the expansive cases 
involving the proof of intent through statistics.  The doctrinal changes in the 
late 1980s were politically motivated whereas, although the current Court 
remains conservative in orientation, the more recent cases are about seeking 
to adjust the doctrine to meet changing social conditions, an issue explored 
in detail in the next section. 
 
III.  THE COURT’S RECENT UPDATING OF THE DOCTRINE. 
 
 The seventies marked the Court’s development of employment 
discrimination doctrine, and the latter half of the 1980s witnessed a 
substantial and what was a politically-inspired retrenchment of protections 
for the victims of discrimination.  That retrenchment led to the statutory 
action in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which provided new 
remedies and also reversed a series of Supreme Court decisions.   The 
following decade primarily was relatively quiet, with modest doctrinal 
innovations and a series of relatively minor procedural decisions.54  It was 
only recently that the Court began to revisit its earlier doctrine with a 
concerted eye towards aligning that doctrine with contemporary social 
conditions.    
 
A.  Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire:  Rejecting the Continuing Violations 
     Doctrine. 
 
 The case involving Lilly Ledbetter’s challenge against Goodyear 
was the first of the recent cases in which the Supreme Court began to 
realign its existing legal principles.  Like some of the other recent cases, 
Ledbetter had all of the trappings of a case that easily could have arisen in 
                                                 
53  See id. at 295-98. 
54 See, e.g., O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996) (age 
discrimination plaintiff need not prove that she was replaced by person who falls outside of 
protected class); Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (former employees can pursue 
claims); Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008) (broadly interpreting 
filing requirement consistent with EEOC regulations).  Some of these cases, like Robinson 
above, were designed to overturn outlier decisions by a single appellate court.   
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the 1970s.  Lilly Ledbetter was the first, and for most of her employment 
history, the only female supervisor in the Alabama Goodyear plant where 
she worked.55  During her employment, she encountered a series of 
problems and eventually discovered that she was the lowest paid supervisor, 
even though she had greater seniority than many of her male peers.  
Towards what would turn out to be the end of her Goodyear career, 
Ledbetter filed a charge with the EEOC raising various claims of 
discriminatory treatment, including a salary discrimination claim.56   
 
 When the case reached the Supreme Court, Ledbetter was seeking to 
recover for the salary discrimination she had experienced throughout her 
career even though she had not filed a claim until just before she resigned.  
Although under Title VII’s short filing deadlines Ledbetter’s salary claim 
would have been time-barred, there was precedent – in this instance from 
the 1980s case of Bazemore v. Friday – that seemed to support allowing her 
claim to go forward.  That case involved the segregation and subsequent 
pay claims of the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service, which 
prior to the effective date of Title VII had two separate divisions based on 
race and paid the African-American agents substantially less than their 
white counterparts.57  Much of that pay discrimination arose prior to the 
effective date of the Civil Rights Act, and part of the Bazemore case 
concerned whether an employer had an obligation to remedy pay 
discrimination that originated when such discrimination was permissible.  
In language that seemed to apply directly to Ledbetter’s situation, the 
Supreme Court, unanimously held that the extension service must correct 
the current effects of the discrimination stating:  “Each week’s paycheck 
that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong 
actionable under Title VII . . .”58  In other words, the state was required to 
remedy the salary disparities even though they arose before the statute 
deemed them discriminatory.  
 
 But that language came twenty years before Ledbetter and involved 
a situation that originated in the 1970s, a situation and time that was clearly 
different.  In Bazemore, there was no delay in the filing of the complaint but 
rather the issue was whether the employer could continue to pay its African-
                                                 
55 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643-44 (2007) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).    
56  Ms. Ledbetter was hired in 1979.  In March 1998, she submitted a questionnaire to 
the EEOC and filed a formal charge of discrimination in July 1998.  She took early 
retirement in November 1998, and subsequently filed her lawsuit.  See 550 U.S. at 621-22. 
57  478 U.S. 385 (1986).   
58  Id. at 395 (Brennan, J., joined by all Members of the Court, concurring in part).  
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American agents less than the white agents because they had done so 
historically.  From that perspective, the issue was largely the same as 
presented in the Griggs case:  could the employer perpetuate past practices 
if that led to differential pay or a segregated workforce?  In contrast, the 
issue in Ledbetter was quite different, namely why had she had not  
complained sooner and, relatedly, what it would mean if the Court allowed 
her claim to go forward to challenge what was alleged to be a career marred 
by discrimination.  There was no easy answer to the first question regarding 
the lateness of her complaint, and surprisingly, none was offered.  Instead, 
her attorneys sought to rely on the language from Bazemore without 
explaining why she had failed to complain during the course of her career.  
Oddly enough, the best explanation might have been true:  she did not know 
about the pay discrimination until someone provided her with an 
anonymous note, which was the explanation she offered to the media after 
the case was decided but not to the courts.59  This is one way in which wage 
claims are distinct from other discrimination claims since employees often 
do not have wage information regarding their co-workers and will be 
unaware of any pay discrepencies.60   
 
 Another possible explanation reflects the changed landscape of 
antidiscrimination law, and while it may have resonated in an earlier era by 
the time the Ledbetter case came around it was effectively foreclosed.  
Employees frequently contend that they failed to file a timely complaint 
because they feared retaliation from their employer.61  Such a fear is surely 
not irrational, and retaliation remains a substantial concern for many 
employees.62  At the same time, over the last decade the Supreme Court has 
created doctrine that is highly protective of retaliation claims, thus 
                                                 
59  Ms. Ledbetter provided her clearest explanation for why she failed to file a claim 
earlier in her Congressional testimony in support of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.  See 
Testimony of Lilly Ledbetter before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Sept. 28, 
2008.  During her court case, she failed to offer an explanation for her delayed filing but 
instead sought to rely on the legal precedents to argue that her claim was timely.  For a 
thorough discussion of the background see Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead? The 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL. L. REV. 499, 507-10 (2010).      
60  Often this lack of knowledge is due to employer policies that prohibit employees 
from discussing their pay.  These policies likely run afoul of the protection of the National 
Labor Relations Act but remain common.  For a discussion see Leonard Bierman & Rafael 
Gely, Love, Sex and Politics?  Sure.  Salary?  No Way:  Workplace Social Norms and the 
Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167 (2004).  
61  The fear of retaliation, often well-founded, is discussed in Deborah L. Brake and 
Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 859, 903-905 (2008).  
62  Id. at 905. 
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presumably minimizing an employees’ fear of retaliation.63  Indeed, this is 
one of the ways in which employment discrimination has evolved; no 
longer can an employee simply articulate a fear of retaliation to excuse a 
failure to file a claim since the Court has made it clear that the law will 
protect those who file complaints.  And, in the context of a complaint-based 
system, it surely makes sense to require employees to file complaints so as 
to bring issues to the employer’s attention.    
 
 As a result, the real issue in the case was whether the Court would 
apply its reasoning from Bazemore to allow Ms. Ledbetter’s claim to go 
forward or whether it would find a way to distinguish or repudiate that case.  
If her claim had arisen in the 1970s or the 1980s, the Court likely would 
have allowed the claim to proceed but the passage of time highlighted the 
differences in the cases.  As noted, Bazemore involved the continuation of 
pay discrimination from the time the extension service had lawfully 
segregated its employees – it was blatant and relatively easy to measure, 
and a circumstance that would have a finite ending.64  Once the Supreme 
Court announced in Bazemore that an employer was obligated to remedy 
pay discrimination that occurred prior to the effective date of the Civil 
Rights Act, employers would presumably correct those pay disparities.  In 
other words, this was a quintessential first generation issue.  In contrast, if 
Lilly Ledbetter’s claim were allowed to move forward, salary claims would 
always remain alive so long as a past discriminatory, and typically discrete, 
act had current effects.   From an employer’s perspective, these two issues 
were dramatically different.        
 
Not surprisingly, the Court dismissed Ms. Ledbetter’s claim but did 
so in a disingenuous way.  Rather than stating that the Bazemore language 
was designed to address a different issue from a different era, it chose to 
distinguish the case by emphasizing that the policy at issue in Bazemore 
was facially discriminatory.65  This was simply untrue; indeed, the state of 
North Carolina had argued for a decade that its current salary structure was 
                                                 
63  This issue is discussed in more detail below but by the time the Ledbetter case was 
decided, the Supreme Court had issued a series of cases that provided strong protections 
relating to retaliation claims.  See, e.g., Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 
548 U.S. 53 (2006) (adopting liberal standard for determining when an individual had been 
retaliated against).  
64 Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 391 (1986) (per curiam) (discussing the 
perpetuation of pay disparities). 
65 The Court distinguished the situations by emphasized that Bazemore involved a 
“facially discriminatory pay structure that put[] some employees on a lower scale because 
of race . . .” Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 634. 
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free of any past discrimination.66   As will be true in the other cases 
discussed in this article, the Supreme Court sought to distinguish rather than 
overturn its precedent, and in doing so, emasculated that precedent, which 
had the effect of serving the same function as if it had been overruled.  
There simply are no more facially discriminatory pay structures, and thus 
the Bazemore decision is no longer applicable to contemporary pay cases.  
 
 There was a related but implicit issue the Supreme Court was 
addressing in Ledbetter and that is the confounding issue of the “present 
effects of past discrimination,” or what is sometimes known as the 
continuing violations doctrine.  This was an issue that had some vitality in 
the early years of Title VII but never gained currency because there was no 
ready definition of what constituted a continuing violation.67  The Ledbetter 
situation was one such example – the effects of salary determinations made 
early in her career had a continuing effect on her later salary but that 
seemed unsatisfactory because it would apply to all such situations, even if 
the entity itself had implemented clear nondiscriminatory policies in the 
intervening years.  So in one fell swoop, the Bazemore decision and the 
continuing violations doctrine were gone.                     
 
B.  AT&T v. Hulteen and Lost Pension Rights.     
 
Of the four cases discussed in this section, AT&T v. Hulteen was 
likely the least controversial and is similarly likely to be the least 
influential.68  Like Ledbetter, the case involved an allegation of 
discrimination that had occurred some thirty years earlier but the underlying 
question was whether the employer had a duty to remedy that 
discrimination, an issue that mirrored those the Court addressed in the 
formative 1970s period.  There was, however, a significant difference with 
the Ledbetter case that may have made Hulteen potentially more attractive 
                                                 
66  Prior to the Ledbetter decision, Bazemore had been interpreted by lower courts for 
twenty years and none had emphasized the facially discriminatory nature of the original 
pay scale.  See Shear v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448, 452 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying Bazemore to 
allow claim to go forward because plaintiff had received “less pay with each paycheck”); 
Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 257 (3rd Cir. 2001) (following Bazemore to conclude 
“each pay check constituted a distinct paycheck”).      
67 The continuing violations doctrine typically meant one of three situations.  One was 
a practice or policy that was, in fact, continuing and therefore was subject to suit so long as 
the policy was in place.  Other times the concept was a synonym for a pattern or practice 
claim, while occasionally it fell into some murky territory so that one court could say “the 
relevant strain of continuing violations doctrine is that a systematic policy of discrimination 
is actionable even if some or all of the events evidencing its inception occurred prior to the 
limitations period.”  Williams v. Owens-illinois, 665 F.2d 918, 925 (9th Cir. 1982).  
68 556 U.S. 701 (2009). 
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to the Court – the issue here was not why Hulteen had failed to complain 
earlier but whether the employer had a duty to address the effects of a 
discriminatory practice that directly affected current pension payouts.   
 
One reason the Hulteen case felt old is that it was.  The plaintiffs 
had all taken pregnancy leave prior to 1979, under a policy that treated 
pregnancy leave discriminatorily but lawfully until 1978 when the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) was enacted.69  Once the PDA was 
passed, AT&T changed its policy but it did not correct its prior practice that 
had failed to take into account pregnancy leave when calculating seniority 
and pension benefits.  The plaintiffs argued that AT&T had a duty to rectify 
its past practice but citing a series of cases that dated from the 1970s and 
80s, the Court upheld the policy holding, in effect, that the company had no 
duty to remedy a practice that was lawful when enacted.70   
 
Together Hulteen and Ledbetter put an end to the eighties’ notion of 
a continuing violations theory, and the related concept of the present effects 
of past discrimination.  These concepts, including the Bazemore case, had 
survived in the lower courts but had not found their way into the Supreme 
Court for decades.  The era of correcting discrimination that arose years ago 
has now officially ended.  The next two cases took up important concepts 
regarding class action cases and patterns of discrimination, and as was true 
with the present effects of past discrimination, the Court was reluctant to 
make the old clothes fit the new emperor.      
          
 C.  Ricci v. DeStefano:  Rejecting the Disparate Impact Theory.  
 
 The case of Ricci v DeStefano involved discriminatory tests that 
were administered by the City of New Haven for promotions within its fire 
department. Although the procedural posture was different, the underlying 
facts of the Ricci case offered a carbon copy of the many testing claims that 
had arisen involving fire or police examinations reaching back several 
decades.  Cases involving police and fire departments were among the very 
first cases brought by the United States Civil Rights Division within the 
Department of Justice, in large part in response to the Kerner Commission 
Report that had concluded that one of the reasons for the urban riots of the 
late-1960s was because the composition of police departments failed to 
                                                 
69 Id. at 705. 
70 Virtually all of the cases the Court relied on were decades old.  See California 
Brewers Assn. v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 
U.S. 63 (1977); Teamsters v. United States, 432 U.S. 324 (1977); Nashville Gas Co. v. 
Satty, 4343 U.S. 136 (1977); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).     
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reflect their communities.71  As soon as Title VII became applicable to 
public employers, lawsuits were filed against most major cities and the vast 
majority of the claims involved challenges to written examinations.72   
 
 Those examinations had two common features:  they were multiple 
choice tests that often had little connection to police or fire work and they 
uniformly had adverse impact against African Americans, and in some 
jurisdictions, Latinos.73  Many jurisdictions settled the claims by entering 
into consent decrees that provided for integrating the department while 
creating new examinations.74  Over time, the cases began to trail off and 
some moved to the promotional levels, but the underlying issue of the 
adverse impact of the examinations has never waned. 
 
 By all appearances, the Ricci case involved another first generation 
dispute.  The New Haven fire department had a lengthy history of both 
discrimination and litigation, and this particular dispute involved 
promotional examinations for Lieutenant and Captain positions.  The City 
                                                 
71 See National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder Report, 9-11 (New York 
Times Ed. 1978) (“We have cited deep hostility between police and . . . communities as a 
primary cause of the disorders surveyed by the Commission . . . In practically every city 
that has experienced racial disruption since the summer of 1964 – abrasive relationships 
between police and [blacks] have been a major source of grievance, tension, and ultimately 
disorder.”).  The Report, originally published in 1968, concluded by recommending 
increased diversity so that departments better reflected the communities they served.  Id. at 
299.   
72 See, e.g., United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (police); 
United States v. Virginia, 620 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980) (Virginia State Police); United 
States v. Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977) (police); United States v. San Francisco, 
656 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ca. 1987) (fire); United States v. New Jersey, 614 F. Supp. 387 (D. 
N.J. 1985) (fire); United States v. Yonkers, 609 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (police); 
United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (police and fire). 
73  Many of the early tests were “off-the-shelf” tests that resembled IQ examinations 
and rarely had any obvious connection to police work.  The test at issue in the famous case 
of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) asked logical reasoning questions that one 
might find in an SAT examination.  A copy of that test was attached as an Appendix to the 
appellate court decision (Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1975)) and is 
discussed in Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?  53 UCLA L 
.REV. 701 (2006).   
74 See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979) 
(upholding police department’s voluntary affirmative action plan); Officers for Justice v. 
Civil Service Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982) (approving consent decree for San 
Francisco police department); United States v. City of Philadelphia, 499 F. Supp. 1196 
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (entering consent decree in challenge to employment of women in 
Philadelphia Police Department).  For a discussion of the litigation regarding police and 
fire departments see Paul Burstein & Susan Pitchford, Social-Scientific and Legal 
Challenges to Educ. And Test Requirements in Employment, 37 SOC. PROBS. 243 (1990).   
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of New Haven is a diverse mid-sized city with approximately 130,000 
residents, with whites comprising just over forty percent of the population, 
African Americans just over a third and Latinos making up a quarter.75  In 
contrast, the officer ranks within the fire department were nearly 80% 
white, even though the firefighter ranks more closely resembled the city’s 
population.76  Lawsuits had also plagued the department from the early 
1980s.77 
 
 Although the Ricci controversy began in 2003, the similarities to the 
seventies-style litigation were hard to miss.  For example, the disparity in 
the officer ranks was similar to what was typically found in the early cases, 
and the City created written examinations that were likewise similar to the 
kinds of examinations that were routinely administered in the seventies.  In 
this respect New Haven was a contemporary outlier, as many jurisdictions 
had moved away from multiple-choice examinations to what are known as 
assessment centers, where leadership skills that are difficult to measure 
through written examinations are assessed through simulations.78  To be 
fair, the City was not entirely to blame for its continued reliance on written 
examinations—a negotiated agreement with the union, as well as a 
provision in the City charter, established the procedures and the scoring 
weights that were to be used for the firefighter promotional examinations.79  
Yet, by all appearances, the City looked to be operating on principles that 
had been established in the seventies and eighties – principles that had been 
repeatedly successfully challenged in litigation. 
 
                                                 
75 These figures are from the 2010 census, and are available at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/09/0952000.html.  Between 2000 and 2010, the 
population grew about 5% with a significant influx (16.5%) of foreign-born individuals.   
76  As of 2003, African Americans constituted 30% of the city’s firefighters but only 
9% of officer ranks at Captain or higher, while Hispanics represented 16% of the firefighter 
ranks but again only 9% of the officers.  See 557 U.S. at 611 (Ginsburg, dissenting).  
77 The Fire Department’s history of discrimination and related litigation is discussed in 
Cheryl I. harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, 
Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 88-91 (2010).   
78  Assessments center are commonly used for promotional examinations and have 
been demonstrated to be better predictors of performance than written tests.  See, e.g., 
George C. Thornton III & Michael J. Potemra, Utility of Assessment Center for Promotion 
to Police Sergeants, 39 PUBLIC PERSONNEL MGT. 59 (2010) (documenting utility of 
assessment center process).  Assessment centers have been around for many years.  See, 
e.g., Joan E. Pynes & H. John Bernardin, Predictive Validity of an Entry-Level Police 
Officer Assessment Center, 74 J. OF APPLIED PSYCH. 831 (1989).    
79  557 U.S. at 564 (noting that the contract with the union required that a written exam 
count for 60% of the score with an oral exam counting for 40% of the toral score) and id. 
(City charter requires use of written examinations). 
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 The other obvious connection to those older practices came with the 
examination results.  Both the Captain’s and the Lieutenant’s examinations 
had substantial adverse impact, particularly when the focus was on where 
individuals placed on the examination rather than on the pass/fail rates.  As 
is true with many public employers, the City was required to select its 
officers based on their specific scores with the additional caveat that the 
City could make its selection among the top three scorers.  Given these 
restrictions, it appeared that no African Americans and perhaps one or two  
Latinos would be selected for the Captain positions and all of the 
Lieutenants would be white.80  This would have created a nearly all-white 
officers group in a diverse city with a diverse group of firefighters. 
 
 One aspect of the testing litigation that saw some change over the 
years is that the City of New Haven was troubled by the test results that 
excluded minority firefighters from the officer corps.81  This was also true 
in some of the early litigation, particularly where the City had undergone 
political changes so that the Mayor’s office was occupied by an African-
American in a majority black city.82  Many of those cases were also settled 
and led to some of the more controversial Supreme Court rulings in the 
eighties that allowed white firefighters to challenge settlements even after 
they had been approved by a court.83  So even New Haven’s concern for the 
adverse impact of the examination was not entirely new and the case 
undoubtedly looked like many of the cases that had previously come before 
the Court stretching all of the way back to the 1970s. 
 
 The twist, to the extent there was one, was that the City voluntarily 
determined that it would discard the test results and wait to make 
                                                 
80 The Supreme Court reported the numbers as follows:  “Seventy-seven candidates 
completed the lieutenant examination--43 whites, 19 blacks, and 15 Hispanics. Of those, 34 
candidates passed--25 whites, 6 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Eight lieutenant positions were 
vacant at the time of the examination. As the rule of three operated, this meant that the top 
10 candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to lieutenant. All 10 were 
white. Subsequent vacancies would have allowed at least 3 black candidates to be 
considered for promotion to lieutenant. Forty-one candidates completed the captain 
examination--25 whites, 8 blacks, and 8 Hispanics. Of those, 22 candidates passed--16 
whites, 3 blacks, and 3 Hispanics. Seven captain positions were vacant at the time of the 
examination. Under the rule of three, 9 candidates were eligible for an immediate 
promotion to captain--7 whites and 2 Hispanics.”  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 566.   
81 The City’s decision not to certify the test results after several days of hearings 
sparked the litigation.  See id. at 574-75. 
82 For a comprehensive discussion regarding many cities see AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
MAYORS: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE AMERICAN CITY (David R. Colburn & Jeffrey S. Adler 
eds., 2001).  
83  See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
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promotions until a better examination could be developed.  The City’s 
decision followed a series of Commission hearings regarding the test results 
and at least nominally the validity of the test, though the City never 
commissioned or performed a formal validation study to determine the 
merits of the examination.84  Rather, the hearings suggested that the City 
might be vulnerable to a lawsuit if it promoted from the examinations given 
their substantial adverse impact.85  The dynamics of the New Haven fire 
department made this a situation the City could not win, as their decision to 
abandon the test results led to a lawsuit by the white firefighters.   
 
 In this respect, the litigation may have resembled some of the many 
reverse discrimination claims that were filed in the nineteen eighties but 
enough had changed since then so that the litigation also proceeded in a 
different direction.  Outside of the intervention case – Martin v. Wilks – the 
reverse discrimination fury of the eighties never yielded the results anti-
affirmative action zealots had expected, and much of that litigation subsided 
after the lower courts made it more difficult for such claims to proceed to 
trial.86  But the change that captivated the Supreme Court was simply a 
matter of time – it was one thing for the Court to give the benefit of the 
doubt to challenges to adverse results in the seventies and eighties, a time 
when the segregated and inferior quality of most schools attended by 
minority students was still acutely present, and it was quite another to 
continue that stance some thirty years later.   
 
 To be more specific, when someone asked in the 1970s why the 
examinations had adverse impact, the answer was all but obvious and never 
really in dispute:  African Americans had been provided with inferior 
education and training.  This was, after all, the rationale that lay behind the 
creation of the disparate impact theory.87  But the same question did not 
yield the same answer thirty years later, and one of the odd aspects of  
                                                 
84 The City’s contract with the test developer contemplated the preparation of a 
“technical report.”  Id. at 566.  Although it is not clear what the contents of the report 
would have been, or whether it would have served as a validation study, the City opted not 
to request the report.   
85  Id. at 572. 
86  See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).  The Wilks case was part of a litany of 
cases challenging the use of racial preferences in consent decrees with mixed results.  For 
example, although the Court vacated an injunction prohibiting the use of seniority-based 
layoffs that were inconsistent with the terms of a consent decree (Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 
U.S. 561 (1984)), it rejected a challenge to the use of broad remedial measures that went 
beyond what a court could have ordered as judicial relief.  See Firefighters v. Cleveland, 
478 U.S. 501 (1986).  The Wilks case was subsequently superseded by a provision of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).    
87  See note 17 supra. 
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disparate impact litigation is that the reason the examination has adverse 
impact is rarely at issue; the mere fact of adverse impact requires the 
employer to justify its practice.  That may have made sense in an earlier era 
but by the time the Ricci case reached the Supreme Court, the presumption 
that the test results were the product of unequal educational opportunities 
was far more attenuated.  And because of the way the cases unfold, no other 
explanation was offered, leaving the Court to its own assumptions regarding 
the source of the test disparities.   
 
 This is an important point that bears emphasis, particularly since it is 
central to the underlying claim I am advancing.  I do not mean to suggest 
that racial inequities in education have been eliminated; far from it as our 
educational system remains stubbornly plagued by such inequities.88  
Rather, what I mean to suggest is that the source of those inequities has 
changed – no longer can they be readily traced to the “separate but equal” 
regime that directly accounted for the disparities that led to the early 
disparate impact cases.  Thirty years is a long time to be replaying the same 
dispute, and it would be a mistake to claim that the problems at issue in 
Ricci were the same that were at issue in Griggs.    
 
 This perspective focusing on changed social conditions helps 
explain the Court’s Ricci decision, though as was true in Ledbetter the 
Court’s discussion was anything but direct.  It was clear, however, that 
whatever patience the Court had for the disparate impact theory has long 
since evaporated.  Without at least some explanation for why the minority 
candidates fared worse than their white counterparts, it appeared that the 
disparate impact theory was no longer serving any purpose, particularly 
since among those who are not sympathetic to the disparate impact theory 
there are neutral explanations for the results.  For example, the majority 
opinion alludes to the hard work of the white firefighters as an explanation 
                                                 
88  Contemporary analyses of data continue to demonstrate substantial inequities across 
our educational system.  This was the conclusion of a recent report commissioned by the 
Secretary of Education.  See Equity and Excellence Commission, For Each and Every 
Child: A Strategy for Education Equity and Excellence 13 (2013) (“If on average, African 
American and Hispanic students performed academically at the level currently achieved by 
white students, overall student performance for the United States would rise from below 
the developed-country average to a respectable position ahead of, for example, Australia 
and Germany.”).   The Report goes on to identify many causes of the persistent inequality.  
See also WHITHER OPPORTUNITY? RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS AND CHILDREN’S LIFE 
CHOICES (G.Duncan & R. Murnane eds. 2011); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: 
URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013); 
WILLIAM SCHMIDT AND CURTIS MCKNIGHT, INEQUALITY FOR ALL: THE CHALLENGE OF 
UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS (2012).  
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for the test results.89  Indeed, if the examination results are the product of 
merit, there is little reason why the disparate impact theory would displace 
those results so long after the original Griggs decision. 
 
 I do not mean to suggest that the results were the product of merit, 
rather I want to emphasize the assumptions or themes that underlie the 
Supreme Court’s decision, and there is little question that in its decision to 
uphold the examinations, the Court saw the examination results as 
consistent with a meritocratic process.  There was certainly good reason to 
question this assumption given that no evidence was ever introduced that 
would have established the validity of the tests, just as there was no 
meaningful evidence introduced regarding the reason for the adverse results.   
 
 These two facts – the absence of evidence on either the validity or 
the underlying results – demonstrate how the disparate impact theory no 
longer fits our social conditions, and in this respect, validates the Supreme 
Court’s decision to uphold the challenge brought by the white firefighters.  
As noted previously, in the early years of the disparate impact theory, no 
evidence was necessary to explain the source of the adverse results, but it is 
difficult to indulge that same presumption today given the progress we have 
made over the last four decades.  It certainly may be true that the minority 
firefighters attended inferior schools that left them ill prepared for written 
examinations, and it might also be that the more diffuse discrimination that 
African Americans and Latinos experience today limited their test taking 
abilities.  Yet, the grounds for assuming these factors explain the test 
disparities are no longer as strong as they once were, and there is also the 
possibility that the white firefighters did study more for the test, and they 
might have done so not for any reason that would be tied to their whiteness 
but rather because a promotion might have meant something more to 
someone who came from a long line of firefighters, as is more commonly 
true for the white firefighters.90  It was also possible that the white 
firefighters had simply been on the job longer.   
 
                                                 
89  Toward the end of the opinion, Justice Kennedy noted the “justified expectations” 
of the candidates and added, “Many of the candidates had studied for months, at 
considerable personal and financial expense, and thus the injury caused by the City’s 
reliance on raw racial statistics at the end of the end of the process was all the more 
severe.”  Id. at 593.  
90 See Stephen Reinhardt, Where Have You Gone, Jackie Robinson? 43 UCLA L. REV. 
43, 45 (1995) (discussing the prevalence of family connections among white firefighters); 
Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV. J. OF 
LAW AND GENDER 581, 587-92 (2010) (discussing urban firehouses with particular focus 
on New Haven). 
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 Whatever the reason, it is no longer feasible, or desirable to ignore 
these or other  factors that might explain the examination results.  Similarly, 
there is no longer any basis for assuming the test is discriminatory in its 
substance, an assumption that seems to continue to pervade popular 
mythology.  There was nothing about this particular test to suggest that it 
was biased in a way that would favor white test takers.  There were 
concerns that some of the questions were inappropriate for New Haven – 
questions that asked about “downtown” that made little sense within New 
Haven and may have been borrowed from a New York City examination – 
but there was no reason to believe that those questions would be racially 
skewed in a way that would favor whites.91  Questions were also raised 
about the costs of the material92 but again it is not clear why white 
firefighters would be more readily able to afford the cost of the study 
materials.   
 
 Perhaps the most mystifying part of the litigation was not the 
explanation for the disparate results but the fact that no one seemed 
interested in whether the examination provided any useful information.  In 
fact, this was one of the original justifications for the disparate impact 
theory – the employer was required to justify the use of its test when the 
results clearly disfavored a historically disadvantaged group.93  Yet, despite 
its lengthy administrative and judicial history, there was no testimony in 
Ricci regarding how effective the examination was at choosing, or 
predicting, who would be successful officers.  Ordinarily, this would be the 
issue at the center of a validation study, but the City eschewed any 
validation effort, and consistent with the rest of the litigation, did so without 
offering any explanation for its decision.   
 
 Something seems to have gone seriously awry when, more than 
forty years after the Civil Rights Act was passed, years of litigation can go 
by without anyone explaining either the reason for the disparate results or 
the validity of the examination – the two questions that should be the most 
critical part of any disparate impact inquiry.  This is another sign that the 
old theory does not fit the new social conditions, and the Supreme Court 
effectively sent a message that these old-style claims would no longer have 
                                                 
91  See id. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“A number of exam questions . . . were not 
germane to New Haven’s practices or procedures.”).   
92 This issue was raised by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent.  Id.  In addition to the costs, 
she also noted that some individuals had to wait for a month and a half to receive the 
materials while others had obtained the materials earlier.  Id. 
93  See Griggs, 401 U.S. at  431.  This is also one of the widely misunderstood parts of 
the disparate impact test – the presence of adverse impact does not invalidate the test, it 
only requires the employer to justify its use.    
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an easy path.  At least that is one way to read the case, and it is too early to 
see how lower courts might interpret the case.94  Another possibility is that 
the lower courts will simply treat this case as involving an employer’s 
voluntary effort to address the adverse effects of its examinations and find 
little in the decision for the more common circumstance when plaintiffs 
sued to challenge the validity of the examination. 
 
 D.  Wal-Mart v. Dukes and Statistical Proof of Discrimination. 
 
 In some ways the massive sex discrimination class action suit 
against the retailer Wal-Mart might appear to be a classic third generation 
claim.  Here the plaintiff class was suing the world’s largest retailer – one 
with a fierce reputation for litigating rather than settling – for companywide 
discrimination against its female employees in pay and promotions.  Yet, 
the underlying claim in the case largely mapped onto a strategy that had 
been developed in the 1970s to challenge the hiring and assignment of 
women in grocery stores, and the statistical analysis that was offered turned 
out to be fairly rudimentary akin to a first generation claim, in this instance 
based on the earlier cases of Teamsters and Hazelwood.   
 
 Before proceeding further, it is important to note that the Wal-Mart 
litigation, in its original form, never proceeded beyond the class 
certification stage so it is quite possible that the attorneys representing the 
plaintiffs would have advanced a different and more sophisticated analysis 
at trial.95  Nor should the following discussion be seen as a criticism of the 
plaintiffs’ methodology, though I will say that they should have been aware 
that the Supreme Court was likely to view their evidence skeptically since it 
was so basic as to make it difficult to draw any broad conclusions in a world 
                                                 
94 To date only a handful of cases have sought to apply Ricci and most have 
distinguished the case.  See Marashiello v. City of Buffalo, 709 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(distinguishing Ricci in rejecting white firefighter’s challenge to replacing old test results 
with a new promotional test); United States v. City of New York, 731 F. Supp. 2d 291, 298 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that “Ricci’s specific holding does not control here, since a federal 
court attempting to remedy identified discrimination enjoys far more authority than an 
employer attempting to remedy potential discrimination.”), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, 717 F.3d 72 (2nd Cir. 2013).  In one case that was factually similar to Ricci, a 
District Court applied the case to hold the city liable for discarding test results.  See Oakley 
v. City of Memphis, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 143451 (W.D. Tenn. 2010).         
95 The case was originally filed in 2001 and was litigated for more than ten years 
through the Supreme Court decision but never moved beyond the class certification stage.  
The Court of Appeals had twice affirmed the lower court’s decision to certify the class, 
though there was a lengthy period between the two decisions.  See Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 603 
F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), affirming lower court decision reported at 222 F.R.D. 
137 (N.D. Cal. 2004).   
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where gender discrimination is no longer perceived as the automatic 
explanation for segregated job patterns.   
 
 To provide some context to the case, it will be helpful to describe 
briefly the cases that were filed against grocery stores.   Beginning in the 
1970s, and continuing for the next thirty years, many of the largest grocery 
store chains were sued, particularly those on the West Coast where the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys were based and the cases all followed a similar pattern 
that focused on the assignment policies of the stores.96  Within grocery 
stores, men were traditionally assigned to the most important departments – 
meat and produce – while women tended to be clustered on the cash 
registers and in newer or less desirable departments such as bakeries and 
delicatesans.97  These assignments ultimately led to lower pay and fewer 
promotional opportunities for women.  One of the more interesting aspects 
of the litigation is that grocery stores traditionally post photographs of its 
management staff at the front of the stores and the attorneys would send 
paralegals into the stores to do a “visual” inspection of the management 
staff.98  In addition to the photographic evidence, plaintiffs had rudimentary 
statistical data that charted how many women worked for the stores and 
their job assignments.   
 
 As was true with so many of the cases that arose in the 1970s and 
1980s, the grocery store cases were not particularly complicated.  Most of 
the grocery jobs required little education or experience so there was no real 
dispute about different qualifications for men and women, and this was also 
                                                 
96  I have discussed these cases previously. See Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in 
the Nineties, Seventies Style:  Case Studies in the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 
9 EMP. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 1 (2005).  Many of the cases were initiated in the 1980s.  
See, e.g., Hal Taylor & Cathy Cohn, Four Chains Sued for Sex Bias, SUPERMARKET NEWS, 
Aug. 25, 1986, at 18.  
97 See Nicole Harris, Revolt at the Deli Counter, BUS. WK., April 1, 1996, at 32.  A 
New York Times article summarized the allegations in one of the cases as:  “The women 
said they were channeled into dead-end jobs, either working the cash registers or relatively 
new departments like bakeries and delicatessens, rather than the main grocery and produce 
sections . . . where jobs are generally better paid and can lead to promotions.”  Jane Gross, 
Big Grocery Chain Reaches Landmark Sex-Bias Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, at A1.  
The case, one of the few with a published opinion, is Stender v. Lucky Stores, 803 F. Supp. 
259 (N.D. Cal. 1992).     
98  See, e.g., Christine Blank, Ingles Hit By Class-Action Sex-Bias Suit, SUPERMARKET 
NEWS, Mar. 9, 1998, at 4 (“A visual survey of management pictures in 39 Ingles’ stores 
showed that 100% of the manager, assistant manager and produce, meet and grocery 
manager positions were held by men, the plaintiffs’ lawyers said.”); Ann Hull, A Woman’s 
Place, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, at 1A (quoting a union representative as 
stating, “My God, you’d go in the stores and you didn’t need a clipboard to write down 
what you saw.  It was all white guys on those pictures.”). 
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an industry where managers traditionally rose up through the ranks.  The 
defenses offered by the grocery store chains typically involved claims of 
women’s lack of interest in management jobs, or their refusal to relocate to 
find an appropriate position.99  This lack of interest defense, even at this 
early stage of the law, was also tried and true and thus provided these cases 
with an overlay from one of the best known of all sex discrimination cases – 
the EEOC’s case against Sears in which the company successfully defended 
a class claim that women were discriminatorily deprived of commission 
jobs by asserting that women lacked interest in the higher pressure sales 
positions.100 
 
 The grocery store cases represented classic first-generation 
discrimination claims involving overt exclusions and often direct evidence 
in support of the discriminatory treatment of women.  The cases also lent 
themselves to rudimentary statistical analysis, and often involved what the 
law describes as the “inexorable zero” where no women held the contested 
jobs.101  The statistics did little more than measure the disparity of women 
in those positions and offered an estimate of the likelihood that the job 
assignments occurred by chance; what, for example, was the chance that all 
of the women would end up in the bakery rather than behind the meat 
counter.   The vast majority of the cases settled with minimal litigation 
beyond the class certification stage, which also established a pattern for 
similar cases while leaving a surprising dearth of case law in the area of 
statistical proof of discrimination.  Following on the heels of the grocery 
store cases, a substantial claim was filed, and ultimately settled, against the 
retailer Home Depot that was based on similar allegations, namely that 
women were consigned to cash registers while men worked the floors from 
                                                 
99 See, e.g., Kimberly Blanton, In the Publix Eye: $81.5 Million Settlement is a 
Showcase for EEOC’s Activism in High-Profile Class Action Suits, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 
16, 1997, at E1 (company official quoted as saying that “many female associates do not 
have an active interest in stocking shelves”); Gregg Fields, Publix Settles Discrimination 
Case, MIAMI HERALD, May 30, 2001, at D1 (company had attributed lack of women 
mangers to “career choices that women themselves made, such as reducing hours after they 
had children.”).   
100  See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff’d 839 
F2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).   In the case involving Lucky stores, the District Court Judge 
catalogued the list of excuses the company offered for the lack of women in management 
positions:  “[W]omen do not want to work late shifts, men don’t want to compete with 
women or have a woman as their boss . . . that women do not have the drive to get ahead.”  
Stender, 803 F. Supp. at 332.  
101  The language comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in the Teamsters case.  
See Int’l Bhd of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 342 n.23 (“The company’s 
inability to rebut the inference of discrimination comes not from a misuse of statistics but 
from the inexorable zero.”). 
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which promotions arose.102 
 
 Even though it was filed nearly thirty years after the first grocery 
store cases were initiated, the Wal-Mart litigation was virtually identical in 
substance.  There were two basic claims underlying the Wal-Mart litigation.  
The one that drew the most attention, and was likely most critical to seeking 
substantial damages, involved the lack of women managers throughout the 
company.  Here the plaintiffs made simple calculations:  women comprised 
more than 70% of the employees but only about 30% of the managers.103  
On this level, there was no material difference between these basic 
calculations and those that were advanced in the grocery store cases and, 
not surprisingly, the defendants raised many of the same defenses – women 
lacked interest, were unwilling to relocate and were less qualified.  This 
latter issue, the disparate qualifications of men and women was complicated 
because Wal-Mart lacked records for many of the managerial positions.104   
 
 But the real issue in the case, even at the class certification stage, 
was whether it should be possible to assert a claim of systemic 
discrimination based on these simple mathematical comparisons.  In other 
words, is it still possible to attribute discrimination as the cause of observed 
disparities based on little more than the presence of statistically 
significantly fewer women in managerial roles than one might expect?  
Another way of raising the same issue is to ask whether the same inference 
of discrimination that would arise from the statistical disparities in the 
1970s should be permissible some forty years later?   
 
 These are complicated questions that the parties – just as was true in 
the Ricci litigation -- failed to grapple with.  To be sure, the Wal-Mart 
plaintiffs sought to explain why the statistical analysis should be seen as the 
product of discrimination relying on what is sometimes labeled “social 
framework” evidence to explain how it is that sex discrimination occurs in 
large organizations.105  This evidence, put forward through an expert 
                                                 
102 The Stender case, cited in note 100 supra, is the only published case on liability.  
As a general matter, if a case is certified as a class action, there is a very high probability 
the case will eventually settle.   
103 Oddly enough, these figures only appeared in the dissenting opinion issued in the 
Wal-Mart case.  See Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“Women fill 70 percent of the hourly jobs in the retailer’s stores but make up only 33 
percent of management employees.”). 
104  See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 222 F.R.D. 137, 165 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (noting the 
incomplete applicant data Wal-Mart provided to plaintiffs).   
105 The evidence was discussed, and largely dismissed, by the majority.  See 131 S.Ct. 
at 2553-54.  
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declaration, described how discretionary selection systems like the one in 
place at Walmart often operated on stereotypical assumptions about 
women.106   The plaintiffs also offered additional statistical analyses but, in 
terms of the managerial positions, they did not offer much more than the 
basic statistical conclusion that women were severely underrepresented in 
management positions.       
 
 As noted, when the case reached the Supreme Court, the question 
was whether the plaintiffs had satisfied the procedural requirements for 
class certification, and here there was an unusual twist that again 
complicated matters for the plaintiffs.  Although Walmart was highly 
centralized in its supply chain of goods, it was remarkably decentralized in 
its hiring and promotion decisions.  Stores were divided into regions and 
districts and store managers were provided with budgets to cover labor costs 
but could, within a limited range, determine how to structure that budget.107  
In a closely divided decision, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that 
the plaintiffs had failed to establish the commonality necessary to warrant 
class certification.108  This conclusion has led the plaintiffs to file a number 
of smaller class actions around the country, perhaps in a legal version of the 
old adage, “be careful what you ask for,” although to date, it appears that 
the strategy has proved costly and unsuccessful.109 
 
 The Court, however, went beyond the procedural deficiencies to 
express deep skepticism regarding the plaintiffs’ evidence of discrimination.   
For example, the Court criticized the plaintiff’s social framework evidence 
because the plaintiff’s expert – who had worked on several of the grocery 
store cases – was unable to quantify how likely discrimination was to have 
influenced Walmart’s decisionmaking.  Instead, the expert concluded that 
                                                 
106 Id. (noting that plaintiff’s expert “testified that Wal-Mart ha[d] a “strong corporate 
culture,” that makes it “vulnerable” to “gender bias.”).  Needless to say, establishing that a 
system is “vulnerable” to discrimination is not, and should not be, the same as proving 
discrimination, just as proving that an individual is vulnerable to criminal activity should 
lead to a criminal conviction. 
107  The Supreme Court explained:  “Th[e] stores are divided into seven nationwide 
divisions, which in turn comprise 41 regions of 80 to 85 stores apiece. . . Pay and 
promotion decisions . . . are generally committed to local managers’ broad discretion, 
which is exercised in a largely subjective manner.  Local store managers may increase the 
wages of hourly employees (within limits) with only limited corporate oversight.”  131 
S.Ct. at 2547 (citation and quotation omitted).    
108 131 S.Ct. at 2555-56. 
109  Following the Supreme Court decision, the attorneys for the plaintiffs have filed 
class action lawsuits in California, Texas, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Florida.  One district 
court has dismissed class certification.   See Ladik v. Wal-Mart Stores, 291 F.R.D. 263 (D. 
Wisc. 2013) (denying class certification for lack of common questions).  
34 Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law   
the system was “vulnerable to discrimination,” but establishing a 
vulnerability to discrimination is a long way from proving discrimination 
and there was nothing especially retrogressive about the Court’s conclusion 
on this point.110   
 
There remained the question of the statistically significant 
disparities in female managers and here is where the Court subtly 
repudiated its past precedent.  There is little question that the plaintiffs’ 
statistical presentation easily satisfied the Court’s jurisprudence from the 
1970s, and was, in fact, presented in a far more sophisticated way.  Recall, 
that in Teamsters and Hazelwood, the Supreme Court was willing to accept 
the statistical proof as relevant to discrimination on the merits, not just at 
the class certification stage.  The statistical proof in Walmart was far 
stronger than either of those cases with statistically significant disparities 
that were strongly indicative of discrimination and yet the Court failed to 
draw an inference of discrimination and, in fact, was distinctly unimpressed 
by the evidentiary record.  And the reason seems clear, though not without 
controversy – looking out on the floor at Walmart and seeing only male 
managers, the Court no longer saw discrimination as the most likely cause.  
The evidence the Court found compelling in the 1970s was now found 
wanting. 
 
Like so many of these issues, the Court did not articulate either its 
repudiation of the past precedent or the rationale, and there is a difficult 
question lurking in the background that requires addressing.  That question 
is, given the changes in our society and the indisputable decrease in 
discrimination over the last forty years, should discrimination today be 
easier or more difficult to prove?  This is a question on which there has 
been remarkably little debate.  Liberals often act as if discrimination has not 
receded, or that discrimination today is as pernicious as it was in the post-
Jim Crow era, while conservatives tend to think of discrimination as having 
all but vanished.  The truth is obviously somewhere in between.   
 
Discrimination has declined and changed but that does make it any 
less disruptive to the lives of its victims.  But it also seems unlikely that 
                                                 
110 See 131 S.Ct. at 2552 (noting that “Bielby testified that Wal-Mart has a strong 
corporate culture, that makes it vulnerable to gender bias.” (quotations omitted)).  The 
natural response is to note that the case involved the issue of class certification rather than a 
judgment on the merits.  The difficulty with this position involves the sheer cost of class 
action litigation as well as the rather clear evidence that most large employment 
discrimination cases settle after a class is certified.  It is a fair and complicated question 
whether a court should take into account the likelihood that a case might settle in applying 
procedural rules but it would also seem problematic to ignore that fact. 
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when we look out on a workplace and find racial or gender disparities, as 
we will in most workplaces, that we can conclude, without something more, 
that those disparities invariably arise from the discriminatory practices of 
the employer.  In the 1970s, when there were no women or minorities in a 
workplace or in a particular job, it was easy to conclude that discrimination 
was the most likely cause – discrimination was everywhere and in the prior 
decade overt discrimination was lawful.  Today we know that 
discrimination is less prevalent, which can also lead us to a greater 
reluctance to see discrimination as a causal factor. 
 
Yet, and this is the issue at the heart of contemporary discrimination, 
there is no question that discrimination remains an entrenched feature of the 
workplace but it is often more difficult to identify because it is more 
complex in form.  Different names are used to describe the complexity – 
subtle discrimination, implicit discrimination, structural discrimination and 
occasionally unconscious discrimination – but what they all have in 
common is that they are distinctly different from what might be called first-
generation or old-fashioned discrimination, the kind of discrimination 
around which much, if not most, of the existing case law developed.  I will 
return to the difficulty of proving complex discrimination momentarily but 
at this point I want to emphasize how the Court has largely shed its fidelity 
to its former case law in response to the changing nature of discrimination.  
The proof offered in the Walmart litigation may have sufficed to uncover 
discrimination at one time, but today, the Court demands something more 
with the primary problem being that it does not really know, and certainly 
has not said, what that more is.  But if the Court is to update the law – and 
this makes the issue different from that involved with the disparate impact 
theory – it will need to determine what kinds of statistical analysis can 
reliably document contemporary discrimination.        
                                                      
IV. THE COURT’S MODERN TURN 
 
 There is nothing particularly problematic about the Court’s decision 
to update the law, unless one views that decision as infringing upon 
Congress’s mandate.  While Congress could certainly update the law as 
necessary, and this might be a preferred method in the abstract, the reality is 
that it rarely does so and instead typically amends laws, at least in the 
discrimination field, in response to Court decisions.111  This suggests that 
                                                 
111 The two most recent substantial amending acts were both in response to restrictive 
Supreme Court interpretations – the now more than twenty-year old Civil Rights Act of 
1991, and the more recent amendments to the Americans With Disabilities Act.  See 
ADAAA 2008, P.L. 110-325, codified as 42 USCA § 12101, and Civil Rights Act of 1991 
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the two branches have reached a reasonably stable equilibrium with respect 
to who defines the law:  Congress allows the Court to shape the law until it 
provides too restrictive a definition at which point it provides a 
correction.112  It is also possible that the correction or iterative process 
might proceed in the opposite direction – the Court would interpret the 
antidiscrimination statutes too broadly – but at least as measured by 
Congressional overrides this has never occurred in the employment 
discrimination field.113    
 
 Putting aside the institutional issue of who should update the law, 
we can then proceed to assess what the Court has replaced its old 
jurisprudence with, seeking to determine whether a new model has arisen 
that better fits contemporary discrimination. In making this assessment, it 
will be helpful to divide the Court’s doctrine into the traditional categories 
of individual claims of discrimination and systemic claims of 
discrimination, typically defined as class actions alleging either intentional 
discrimination or based on a theory of disparate impact.  From this 
perspective, the Court’s doctrine with respect to individual claims might be 
considered a modest upgrade on the past jurisprudence; the changes the 
Court has made in the last decade include recognitions of different models 
of proof, including those that involve multiple actors or multiple motives 
that offer the potential to better capture contemporary discrimination.114  
Even more important, the Court has established strong and clear guidelines 
for adjudicating retaliation claims.  At the same time, the Court’s vision 
with respect to systemic discrimination is deeply problematic for, while the 
Court has shed its past doctrine, it has failed to replace that doctrine, thus 
leaving a substantial void in claims that seek to uncover a pattern of 
discrimination.  In particular, the Court seems to see discrimination 
primarily as fading rather than evolving and now seems to focus exclusively 
on individual claims of discrimination.  Before exploring how the doctrine 
has evolved, it will be helpful to discuss how discrimination has changed 
over the last two decades in order to evaluate whether that doctrine 
conforms to that change.            
     
                                                                                                                            
discussed supra section II.B. 
112 For a discussion of the relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress with 
a particular focus on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 see Michael Selmi, supra note 51 [Wake 
Forest symposium piece].  
113 One might contend that the Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power, 
recognizing the disparate impact cause of action was broader than Congress originally 
intended but the point here is that Congress has never stepped in to correct a Supreme 
Court decision because it was deemed as too expansive or protective of civil rights.    
114  Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), discussed infra section IV.B.1. 
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 A.  The Changed Nature of Discrimination. 
 
 The premise of the prior section was that discrimination has changed 
both in its prevalence and in its origin.  It is worth repeating that there is 
little question that discrimination has declined substantially since the 
foundational discrimination doctrine was established.  To be blunt, this is 
not a point worth debating though just how much it has declined is often at 
the core of continuing disputes regarding the scope of antidiscrimination 
doctrine.  Those who believe discrimination has become an anomaly are 
often skeptical of the need for a vibrant disparate impact doctrine or ready 
access to the class action device as a means to attack entrenched 
discrimination.115  Under this view discrimination became too easy to allege 
and to prove and the various inferences the early doctrine turned on are no 
longer relevant to contemporary society.  This is the view that is best 
aligned with the recent Supreme Court doctrine where the Court has 
implicitly vacated the earlier inferences.116          
 
 Even if one accepts that discrimination has declined substantially 
there remains the question why antidiscrimination doctrine would need to 
change.  It could be that there would simply be fewer cases because there is 
less discrimination or perhaps if the volume of cases did not decline more of 
the claims would fail.  This argument, however, overlooks the fundamental 
nature of proving discrimination:  ultimately, discrimination is a legal 
conclusion designed to explain observed social conditions, and it 
necessarily relies on drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence.  If 
we see discrimination as having less explanatory power today, then we may 
be less likely to attribute certain behavior or disparities to discrimination.  
This might lead to more defense verdicts but it might also mean that cases 
that succeeded ten or fifteen years ago would now fail.  In other words, the 
proof structures crafted when discrimination was a common cause might 
                                                 
115  See., e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132-35 (2009) (cautioning against class certification in Wal-Mart 
case); Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621 (2011) 
(arguing for changing disparate impact standard to reflect changed social conditions). 
116  This is true of the recent slate of cases that cast doubt on the continuing relevance 
of discrimination in shaping social and political realities.  See Shelby County v. Holder, 
133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) (invalidating section five of Voting Rights Act); Parents Involved in 
Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 
U.S. 557 (2009) (invalidating employer’s voluntary effort to address disparate testing 
results).  One could add to this list a recent retaliation case where the Court declined to 
permit mixed-motive proof because  doing so might “contribute to the filing of frivolous 
claims, which would siphon resources from efforts by employer, administrative agencies, 
and courts to combat workplace harassment.”  University of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. 
v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2531 (2013).     
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require modification, either implicitly or explicitly, to match current social 
conditions. 
 
 There is another view that needs to be integrated into the new proof 
structures, or the new inferential causal chain.  This perspective emphasizes 
how discrimination has changed rather than how it has receded, how 
discrimination has become more subtle in nature, less likely to be linked to 
one bad actor, and because it is more subtle, it is by definition, more 
difficult to establish.  Rather than advocating a tightening of proof 
standards, as we see in the perspective that concentrates on how 
discrimination has declined, this perspective calls for what might be defined 
as a loosening of standards so that subtle discrimination could be more 
easily uncovered.           
 
 Over the last decade, within the legal literature there has been an 
explosive interest in the changing nature of discrimination, with a particular 
focus on what is now termed implicit bias, sometimes also referred to as 
unconscious bias.117  This concept is not necessarily new – indeed Charles 
Lawrence’s famous antidiscrimination article was written in 1986 and 
focused on what he termed “unconscious discrimination.”118  The more 
recent focus on implicit bias differs primarily in the social psychology 
research that has arisen over the last two decades, whereas Charles 
Lawrence’s article was based primarily on a Freudian theory that was not 
tied to experimental research.119           
                                                 
117  The list of legal scholars who have recently emphasized implicit or unconscious 
bias is lengthy, for a partial listing see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and 
Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477 (2007); Katharine T. Bartlett, 
Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit 
Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 189 (2009); Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not 
Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. 
REV. 1275 (2012); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking & Unconscious 
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005);  Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, The Law of 
Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2004);  Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA 
L. REV. 1124 (2012); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in 
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 
997 (2006); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking 
& Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007);  Patrick S. Shin, Liability for Unconscious 
Discrimination? A Thought Experiment in the Theory of Emp. Discrimination Law, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 67 (2010).  For an excellent overview with cautionary notes see Ralph 
Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter? Law, 
Politics & Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1059 (2009).   
118  See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
With Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1987). 
119  Within employment discrimination scholarship, Linda Hamilton Krieger was 
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 The basic premise behind the concept of implicit discrimination is 
that individuals are often unaware of their own biases.  A measurement 
instrument, known as the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) has been 
developed by social psychologists and is available over the internet for 
those who wish to use it, as millions of individuals have now done.120  The 
IAT measures rapid-response word associations, for example, a photograph 
of a famous African American might appear on the screen and the test taker 
then associates the photograph with words from a list.  Based on what is 
now a database that exceeds several million test takers, individuals are often 
quicker to associate African Americans with negative words and the 
response times are then translated into a test score that measures implicit 
bias.  A key aspect of the implicit bias research is that individuals who have 
high scores on the test frequently proclaim values that are steeped in 
equality and would consciously disclaim any intentional bias.121  This 
disconnect between test scores and expressed antidiscrimination norms is 
what leads researchers to proclaim that individuals are often unaware of the 
biases they hold. 
 
 The IAT has been widely used but has more recently come under 
criticism, particularly by a determined and small group of academics.122  
                                                                                                                            
largely responsible for moving into the social psychology literature.  See Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and 
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).   
120  The literature on the Implicit Association Test is now extensive.  For a review by 
the founders see Anthony G. Greenwald et al, Understanding and Using the Implicit 
Association Test:  III.  Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 17 (2009).   For additional discussions see Anthony G. Greenwald et al, Measuring 
Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1464 (1998);   Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, 
Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior and Explicit 
Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 J. OF EXPER. SOC. PSYCH. 435 (2001); Brian A. Zosek, 
Athony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A 
Methodological and Conceptual Review, at 264, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY & THE 
UNCONSCIOUS: THE AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES (2006). 
121 This is a frequent problem in measurements of discrimination, namely that explicit 
statements are inconsistent with actions, or in the case of the IAT with implicit attitudes.  
See, e.g., Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit 
Association Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES INTERGROUP RELATIONS 359 (2007) (in two 
studies the IAT predicted behaviors after controlling for explicit behavior).    
122  See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Phillip E. Tetlock, Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or 
Would Jess Jackson “Fail” the Implicit Association Test?, 15 PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 
257 (2004) (critiquing the attribution of prejudice); Hal Blanton et al., Strong Claims and 
Weak Evidence: Reassessing the Predictive Validity of the Race IAT, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 
567 (2009); Gregory Mitchell & Phillip E. Tetlock, Antidscrimination Law and the Perils 
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One of the critiques of the IAT is that demonstrating implicit bias based on 
rapid word associations will not necessarily translate to biased actions, 
particularly in the workplace where most actions are based on deliberation 
rather than instantaneous decisions.  A series of studies have recently 
sought to document a connection between measured implicit bias and 
discriminatory conduct.  These studies have generally relied on college 
students and artificial workplace decisions – limitations that are common to 
experimental psychology – and the studies have identified limited but 
meaningful relationships between IAT scores and discriminatory 
conduct.123  There are also questions about what the test is actually 
measuring but in terms of applying the test to questions of identifying 
unlawful discrimination more serious issues arise. 
 
 Accepting the test results at face value, the IAT simply provides a 
measure of implicit attitudes, and even if one accepts that the test can serve 
as a fairly reliable predictor of discriminatory conduct, no court would (or 
should) allow a judgment of liability based on a statistical correlation or a 
predictive model.  The various assumptions that would go into such a 
determination would violate any notion of fairness or due process because 
liability would impermissibly turn on a proclivity to discriminate.  But that 
does not mean the IAT has no role to play in uncovering discrimination; 
rather, the IAT can be quite useful in explaining the more subtle nature of 
discrimination for contemporary society.  However, from this angle, the 
concept of implicit bias is not as novel as it is often assumed.      
 
     Implicit bias is closely related to earlier theories of discrimination, 
particularly the concept of aversive discrimination that was developed in the 
1970s largely by the pioneering work of Samuel Gaertner and John 
Dovidio.124  Aversive racism was the label that became applied to observed 
behavior that was inconsistent with an individual’s proclaimed social 
norms.  The theory developed around what are known as helping studies 
where a person would, for example, drop a bag of groceries and wait to see 
if anyone came to help pick them up.125  The studies documented that 
                                                                                                                            
of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006).     
123 See Anthony Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the IAT Test: III.  Meta-
Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 17 (2009) 
124  See, e.g., Adam R. Pearson, John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, The Nature of 
Contemporary Prejudice: Insights from Aversive Racism, 3 SOCIAL & PERSONALITY 
PSYCH. COMPASS 1 (2009); John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism & 
Selection Decisions: 1989 & 1999, 111 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315 (2000); Samuel L. Gaertner & 
John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, at 61, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND 
RACISM (S.L. Gaertner & J. Dovidio, eds. 1986). 
125  See Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black & White 
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individuals were quicker to help members of their own race, and this was 
true even among individuals who espoused theories of equality.  It was 
hypothesized that these individuals failed to internalize accepted social 
norms.  In other words, people would say one thing and do another, much 
like the results suggested by the IAT.  Both theories demonstrate deep 
lingering forms of bias that can translate into discriminatory conduct despite 
the expressed intent of the actors.   
 
 As may be apparent, the theories are also closely related to the 
concept of stereotyping; indeed, stereotyping likely explains at least some 
significant portion of the IAT results.126  There is an extensive literature 
going back decades on stereotyping and there are different forms, some 
more innocuous than others.127  At least in one respect, stereotyping is an 
overbroad group judgment applied to individuals, and today it seems to 
have its strongest effect as applied to gender where stereotypes abound.  For 
example, one might correctly note that women remain primary caretakers 
on average and then mistakenly conclude that all women are likely to be 
primary caretakers.  The stereotype becomes pernicious when it is applied 
to exclude women from various employment opportunities.  One important 
difference with gender stereotypes is that they are less likely to be implicit 
in nature if by implicit we mean that the person who holds the stereotype is 
unaware of doing so.128  A person may be unwilling to admit fidelity to the 
gender  stereotype but that is not the same as being unaware of its force. 
   
 Implicit bias is also sometimes equated with unconscious bias but I 
                                                                                                                            
Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 546 (1980); 
Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Subtlety of White Racism, Arousal and 
Helping Behavior, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 691 (1977).   
126  See, e.g., Corinne A. Moss-Racusin et al., Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases 
Favor Male Students, PNAS EARLY EDITION, 2012 (“Past studies indicate people’s 
be3havior is shaped by implicit or unintended biases stemming from repeated exposure to 
pervasive cultural stereotypes.”). See also, Patricia G. Devine, Implicit Prejudice and 
Stereotyping: How Automatic Are They? 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. Psychol. 757 (2001). 
127  In a recent article, Professor Charles Sullivan traced the issue of stereotyping back 
to 1968 in terms of its appearance in cases.  See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying 
Employment Discrimination, 92 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1431, 1468 (2012).  For some early 
discussions of stereotyping see Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice & Discrimination, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds, 4th ed. 1998). 
Shelley C. Taylor et al., Categorical & Contextual Bases of Personal Meaning and 
Stereotyping, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 778 (1978); Anne Locksley et al., Sex 
Stereotypes and Social Judgment, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 821 (1980). 
128 For a recent discussion on the role of gender stereotypes and inequality see CECILIA 
L. RIDGEWAY, FRAMED BY GENDER: HOW GENDER INEQUALITY PERSISTS IN THE MODERN 
WORLD 145 (2011).  
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believe it is important to distinguish between these two concepts, 
particularly as it applies to the law.  One reason for this is that when we talk 
about the unconscious, there is an implication that the behavior at issue 
cannot be controlled, and if it cannot be controlled, some have suggested 
that it would be inappropriate to hold employers responsible for 
unconscious discrimination.129  Research, however, has shown that there are 
various ways in which implicit bias can be held in check, including by 
engaging in deliberate conduct that will ameliorate the influence of bias on 
snap judgments.130  Using the term “unconscious” also brings up the old 
Freudian concept and might lead to psychiatrists in court trying to uncover 
the deep-seated motives of employers.131  As a matter of terminology, my 
preference has always been to use the term “subtle discrimination,” which 
also best ties into existing doctrine. 
         
 The real issue with the focus on implicit bias is how the law ought to 
adjust to our evolving understanding of discrimination.  In the next section, 
we will see what adjustments the Supreme Court has made over the last 
decade, and we will also see that the Court has mostly been insensitive to 
the concept of implicit or subtle bias.  But it is also difficult to know what 
implications to draw, or to determine the law should adjust.  One problem 
with something like implicit bias is that it is omnipresent and if applied to 
legal cases, could mean that virtually any decision might be tinged with 
bias.  That is obviously too broad a brush and I think it explains why most 
courts have not relied on the concept to infuse their decisions.132                
                                                 
129  See Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999). 
130  See, e.g., Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social 
Cognition Research: Their Meaning & Use, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 297, 319 (2003) (“In a 
variety of studies, the more motivated show evidence of having ‘corrected’ for their 
automatically activated attitudes.”); Zinda Kunda & Steven J. Spencer, When Do 
Stereotypes Come to Mind and When Do They Color Judgment? A Goal-Based Theoretical 
Framework for Stereotype Activation and Application, 129 PSYCH. BULL. 522 (2003) 
(prolonged contact of ten minutes or more can reduce stereotype influence); Nilanjara 
Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: 
Combating Automatic Prejudice With Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 40 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 800 (2001) (can modify simplistic evaluations by sending 
frequent counterstereotype reminders).  
131  Some of this might just be a reaction to the seminal article discussing unconscious 
discrimination that did, in fact, rely on the work of Sigmund Freud.  See Charles R. 
Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).    
132 Only a handful of cases have addressed the concept of implicit bias, and generally 
in a summary fashion.  See, e.g., Saka v. Holder, 741 F.3d 244, 249 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(summarily rejecting claim of implicit bias in an immigration case).  Two cases have relied 
on the concept in ruling for plaintiffs.  See Diaz v. Jiten Hotel, Mgt., Inc., 742 F. Supp.2d 
319, 327 & n.11 (D. Mass. 2011) (acknowledging complexity of discrimination and 
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 The obsessive focus on implicit discrimination has also obscured a 
more important aspect of contemporary discrimination.  Although 
discrimination has become more subtle, the more important issue is that 
discrimination today is the product of cumulative acts that are not traceable 
to a single actor or event.  Rather, discrimination arises from small acts of 
disrespect or distrust that leads to disparate opportunities or results, and is 
often informed by stereotypes throughout the process.133  For example, an 
African American enters the workplace and certain co-workers or 
supervisors assume that the individual is the product of affirmative action, 
which makes that person appear less qualified in their eyes.  This may or 
may not be the product of implicit bias but the result is that the employee is 
afforded  fewer opportunities in the workplace and even within those 
limited opportunities will perform under a cloud of suspicion.134  The 
employee may also be subject to biased evaluations.  In this situation, the 
employee might react in different ways – perhaps by working harder to 
prove himself or he may begin to slack off under the assumption that no 
matter what he does, he will not succeed.  If he were to slack off, it would 
almost certainly be noticed and result in a completion of the circle that ends 
with poor performance evaluations.  If the individual were a woman, the 
stereotypes that started the process would be different but the results would 
likely be the same.  The beginning assumption might be either that the 
individual was not competent because the job at issue was a “man’s” job or 
it might be that the woman was likely to leave the workplace when she has 
children.  In either scenario, the individual might also be subjected to 
                                                                                                                            
concept of implicit bias in denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment); Kimble v. 
Wisconsin Dept. of Workforce Develop., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 778 (E.D. Wisc. 2010) 
(concluding that defendant “behaved in a manner suggesting the presence of ‘implicit 
bias.’”).  A recent case struck the proposed testimony of Anthony Greenwald, one of the 
founders of the IAT, in a case involving class allegations of race discrimination because the 
court found the testimony did not satisfy the federal evidentiary standards for expert 
testimony.  See Jones v. National Council of Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 129236 (N.D. Ill. 2013).  In the case, the defendant proferred a report challenging the 
basis of the IAT by Philip Tetlock, one of the chief antagonists of the concept of implicit 
bias.   
133 For an excellent discussion of the cumulative effect of discreet acts see VIRGINIA 
VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (1998).    
134  An excellent example of the complicated ways discrimination can influence an 
employment process is found in the story and lawsuit of Lawrence Mungin, who sued after 
his quest for partnership was delayed.  He initially received a large jury verdict, which was 
overturned on appeal.  See Mungin v. Katen, Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549 (D.C. Cir. 
1997).  The case itself does not fully capture both the complexity and ambiguity of 
discrimination.  For that one has to turn to the excellent book written by Mungin’s college 
roommate.  See PAUL BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA 
(1999).      
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harassment while on the job – taunts, or statements questioning one’s 
competency, whatever the case may be. 
 
 The important aspect of this form of discrimination is that there is 
no single actor, no single event, but instead the discrimination arises as a 
result of the cumulative effect of a series of discrete acts.  How one assesses 
this situation might depend on the time frame one analyzes.  If one looks 
just at the failed promotion, it might appear that the person was justifiably 
denied a promotion due to poor performance evaluations or even poor 
performance.  One would have to step farther back to understand that the 
person was treated in a discriminatory fashion from the beginning.  But it is 
not an easy story to tell, and the story is only complicated by bringing the 
concept of implicit bias into the equation.            
  
 B.  The Changed Doctrine. 
 
 1.  Individual Claims of Discrimination. 
 
 Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has altered the doctrine 
relating to individual claims of discrimination in two particular ways.  First, 
the Court has made it easier for plaintiffs to proceed under what is known as 
a mixed motives theory, a circumstance where an employer has multiple 
motives for its action, at least one of which is discriminatory.135  As 
discussed more fully below, this judicial innovation was primarily the 
product of clear statutory interpretation and has turned out to be of limited 
utility for most plaintiffs, despite its initial enthusiastic reception among 
academics.136  More important than the expansion of the mixed-motives 
theory, the Supreme Court has crafted a far-reaching doctrine relating to 
retaliation claims, and here the evolution of the doctrine has provided 
employees with an important tool to protect their statutory rights and also 
highlights the individualized complaint-based system that defines the 
contemporary antidiscrimination system.      
 
 
                                                 
135 See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (allowing mixed motive cases 
to be based on circumstantial evidence).  
136 The Supreme Court’s Costa decision was initially met with a wave of enthusiasm 
by academics who saw in the case the potential for greater success on claims of 
discrimination.  See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”:  An 
Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title 
VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa Into a “Mixed Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. 
REV. 71 (2003); Michael Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law:  Price Waterhouse is 
Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas, 53 EMORY L. J. 887 (2004).   
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 a.  The Development of the Mixed Motives Theory.  
 
If one were looking for a way the Court has adapted the law to 
contemporary discrimination, one might look to the development of the 
mixed motives theory, as reflected in the Court’s decision in. Desert Palace 
v. Costa.137  The mixed motives theory involves a circumstance where an 
employer has multiple motives for its decision, some of which might be 
legitimate while others are discriminatory in nature.138  A number of 
scholars have championed the mixed motives theory as best reflecting the 
reality of actual workplace decisions where it is unlikely that a single 
motive underlies a complicated employment decision.139  While it is true 
that the concept of a mixed motive may best describe how decisions are 
actually made, the Supreme Court deserves little credit for moving the law 
forward on this basis, and in fact, the mixed motives theory has not been 
particularly useful in uncovering subtle discrimination.140   
 
 The Costa decision addressed a narrow issue – whether the mixed 
motives theory was limited to claims that involved direct evidence.141   The 
notion that direct evidence was required to pursue a mixed-motives claim 
arose in the venerable case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins as a result of 
Justice O’Connor’s limiting concurring opinion.142  In that case, Ann 
                                                 
137  539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
138 The theory is not unique to Title VII and first arose in the Supreme Court in a First 
Amendment case involving a teacher’s rights.  See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. V. Doyle, 
429 U.S. 274 (1977).  Some twenty years later, the issue resurfaced in a famous case 
involving the denial of a partnership of a woman in the accounting firm of Price 
Waterhouse, discussed infra.  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).   
139  The initial enthusiasm for the mixed-motives theory arose in the mid-1990s shortly 
after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last 
Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 22315-17 (1995) 
(critiquing single-motive theory as inconsistent with realities of modern workplace); Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) 
(advocating greater use of mixed-motives proof model).  
140  Any notion that the Supreme Court was moving the law forward via the mixed 
motives theory has been clearly refuted in their subsequent decisions that declined to 
extend the theory to other contexts.  See University of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. 
Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013) (holding that the mixed motives framework does not apply 
to retaliation claims); Gross v. FBL Finan. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (declining to 
apply mixed-motives framework to age discrimination statute). 
141 Id. at 92 (“The question before us . . . is whether a plaintiff must present direct 
evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under Title VII . . 
.”). 
142 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)(O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(advocating limiting mixed motives theory to situation where the plaintiff can “show by 
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Hopkins was denied consideration for partnership in her accounting firm 
and the Court treated the case as involving mixed reasons, some of which 
might have been discriminatory and others legitimate.143  Although a 
plurality of the Court permitted such a claim to move forward, Justice 
O’Connor concluded that the mixed motives theory should only be 
available in cases that involved direct evidence.144  That case was later 
modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 which broadened the standard for 
succeeding on a mixed-motives claim from proving discrimination was “the 
motivating factor,” to establishing that it was “a motivating factor.”145  In 
Costa, the Supreme Court found that the statutory change was not intended 
to be limited to cases involving direct evidence – which are but a small 
subset of cases -- but instead encompassed the far more common case that 
turns on circumstantial evidence.  Given that the path to Costa ran through 
Congress, it would seem a stretch to attribute the development of the mixed 
motives theory to the Supreme Court, particularly since the Congressional 
action was prompted by what was perceived as a restrictive Court 
decision.146   
 
 As noted above, the Costa decision was initially met with robust 
enthusiasm by academics and some courts as offering a more expansive 
view of discrimination. 147  The very concept of a mixed-motive seemed to 
better capture the reality of the contemporary workplace where things are 
messier and less prone to identifying a single motive for any decision.  
Relatedly, the move from having to prove that discrimination was “the 
motivating factor” to “a motivating factor” should have opened up many 
circumstances to a finding of discrimination, particularly once the direct 
evidence limitation was discarded.  And initially, several courts 
incorporated the theory into their summary judgment standards, making it, 
at least on the surface, harder for employers to obtain summary judgment 
                                                                                                                            
direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision.”). 
143  Id. at 456. 
144  Id. 
145 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
146 This always struck me as an odd interpretation of the Price Waterhouse case if for 
no other reason than the plurality decision, which was altered by the 1991 Act, was written 
by Justice Brennan.  Yet, regardless of how one characterizes the decision, there is little 
question that the statutory change significantly broadened the scope of the mixed motives 
theory.    
147  See William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1549, 1551 (2005) (claiming that “McDonnell Douglas, divested of any procedural 
significance after Desert Palace, no longer seves the purpose it served during its first thirty-
one years.”); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, 
Whither McDonnell Douglas?  53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1948 (2004) (claiming that 
McDonnell Douglas should only apply to a small subset of cases).   
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since employees only needed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
that discrimination played a motivating role in the decision. 148     
 
 Ultimately, however, the initial enthusiasm was not matched by the 
practicing bar, and for reasons that should have been fairly predictable.  
Although the mixed-motives theory makes it easier for a plaintiff to 
establish discrimination, the defendant – and this goes back to the early 
1970s -- is afforded an opportunity to prove that it would have made the 
same decision absent the discriminatory motive.  After the 1991 Act, a 
plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of liability after proving that 
discrimination was a motivating factor, but if the defendant succeeds in 
establishing it would have made the same decision anyway, the remedies 
are limited to injunctive relief and attorney’s fees.149  In that situation, the 
employee wins only to the extent it recovers its attorney’s fees, generally 
not the primary goal of most litigants.  The mixed-motives theory thus 
provides limited appeal as a trial strategy for most plaintiffs and has had 
very little influence on expanding the definition of discrimination.  In 
particular, the theory has not turned out to be a more effective means of 
uncovering subtle discrimination, and most of the cases that have been 
pursued under the mixed motives framework have resembled traditional 
cases.  Indeed, the theory largely fits within the restrictive model the Court 
has developed – it is premised entirely on individual claims of 
discrimination, and as a theory, provides only limited remedies to plaintiffs.                                         
 
 b.  Retaliation Claims. 
 
 If the mixed-motives theory has proved of limited value, the 
invigorated retaliation cause of action has unquestionably offered enhanced 
protections for those who oppose discriminatory practices.  This has been 
one of the most interesting developments within antidiscrimination law over 
the last two decades.  In a series of cases, many of which were textually 
problematic, the Supreme Court has strengthened the protections for 
individuals who complain about discrimination and those cases have 
sparked a torrent of retaliation claims.  For nearly a decade, retaliation 
claims have been the fastest growing of the antidiscrimination claims filed 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).150  Yet, 
                                                 
148 See, e.g., Roberson v. Alltel Info Servs., 373 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2004); Dunbar v. 
Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (N.D. Iowa 2003).  The 
Sixth Circuit has summarized the various approaches courts initially adopted.  See White v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1235 (2009).  
149 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). 
150 Between Fiscal Year 1997 and Fiscal Year 2012, the number of retaliation claims 
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there is also a cautionary note within the case law development -- although 
at first glance, the cases might appear surprisingly protective of the rights of 
plaintiffs, they are, in fact, consistent with the vision that animates the 
Court’s recent doctrine, one that is steeped in individual claims of 
discrimination and, equally important, individual responsibility. 
 
 The concept of retaliation has always been present in the various 
antidiscrimination statutes but, as a cause of action, the issue remained 
largely dormant until the last decade.  The new interest in retaliation 
emerged in a curious case that found its way into the Supreme Court.  In 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, the plaintiff alleged that she 
had suffered retaliation in the form of a reassignment and suspension 
without pay after she complained about her working conditions.151  The lost 
pay was eventually provided when she was reinstated and the reassignment 
involved duties that fell within her original job description.152  As the case 
reached the Supreme Court, the question was what the proper standard 
should be to assess whether someone is the victim of actionable retaliation.  
Unlike some substantive actions, retaliation can be meted out in various 
subtle ways, from office shunning to less desirable surroundings such as 
office space, and the Court had to determine what actions could give rise to 
a claim under Title VII’s retaliation provision.  Lower courts had been split 
on this issue – some circuits had adopted restrictive standards that largely 
paralleled Title VII’s substantive antidiscrimination standard while several 
circuits had adopted a more liberal standard that focused on the purpose 
behind retaliatory acts, which are generally designed to punish and deter 
employees from complaining.153 
 
 The curious part of the case was that the plaintiff had prevailed in 
the lower courts under the most restrictive standard, thus potentially 
rendering the case a rather poor vehicle for assessing the merits or the need 
for a more liberal standard.  Under those circumstances, one might have 
expected the Supreme Court to dismiss the case as improvidently granted 
but, on the contrary and in a clear sign of what was to come, the Court 
adopted a significantly more generous and flexible legal standard, namely 
that an employee could prevail on a retaliation claim by demonstrating that 
                                                                                                                            
filed with the EEOC have doubled, increasing from 18,198 to 37,836 and increasing from 
22% of the total charges to 38%.  No other tracked claim has increased as fast or nearly as 
fast.  The statistics are available at eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm.  
151 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
152 Id. at 70-71. 
153  The Supreme Court discussed the various standards, the more restrictive of which 
required the employee to establish that a decision was “materially adverse” or an “ultimate 
employment decision,”  Id. at 68-69. 
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the employer’s action might deter others from filing claims.154  This 
standard can capture many, though not all, of the various acts thrown at 
individuals who file complaints, or raise concerns about their working 
conditions and is generally quite protective of employee interests.  Indeed, 
in its opinion the Court specifically mentioned the possibility that 
scheduling changes or the absence of invitations to lunch could constitute 
retaliatory acts.155  Even though Ms. White’s loss of income was restored 
when she was reinstated, the Court noted the hardship that attended the loss 
of income she suffered for more than a month.156  This was, by any 
standard, a remarkable decision that was highly protective of the 
employee’s interests.    
 
 From there, the Court has unleashed an impressive and 
unprecedented string of decisions expanding the scope of antidiscrimination 
retaliation provisions while extending those protections to other statutes.  
For example, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, a statute that has 
generated an enormous amount of litigation in recent years, the Court held 
that oral complaints can form the basis of a retaliation complaint.157 The 
Court also held that retaliation claims could be premised on an employer’s 
internal investigation,158 and in perhaps the most revealing decision the 
Court read into the federal sector Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”) a retaliation provision that was clearly not there.159  Retaliaton 
provisions are extremely common in antidiscrimination statutes but the 
typical provision was missing from the federal ADEA, and yet, the Court 
construed the language to include antiretaliation protections in order to 
make it consistent with other statutes.160  This was likely a pragmatic 
decision – there was little question that had the Supreme Court failed to 
interpret the statute to encompass retaliation claims, Congress would have 
amended the statute and done so quickly.  But soon thereafter the Court 
read the filing provisions restrictively in the Ledbetter case leaving it to 
Congress to issue a statutory fix, suggesting that there was something 
                                                 
154 The standard the Court adopted required an employee to demonstrate that an 
employer’s action “might have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.”  Id. at 68-69 (quotations omitted).  
155 Id. at 69.  I should be clear that the Supreme Court did not hold that such acts were 
always retaliatory but that “context matter[ed” and such acts could be the type that would 
deter individuals from proceeding with claims.  Id.    
156  Id. 
157  See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 113 S.Ct. 1325 (2011).  
158  Crawford v. Metropolitan Govt. of Nashville, 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
159  See Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008). 
160   The Court based its decision on an earlier case that interpreted Title IX to include 
a retaliation provision.  See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ. 544 U.S. 167 (2005).  
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distinctive about retaliation claims.   The Court has also read a retaliation 
provision into a Civil-War era statute, and approved of so-called third party 
claims in the case of an individual who alleged he was retaliated against 
after his fiancé filed a sex discrimination claim.161     
 
 This streak of plaintiff victories might portend an emerging concern 
for the rights of employees but, in the context of all of the various decisions, 
a different interpretation might better explain the doctrinal development.  
The purpose behind retaliation provisions is to ensure that employees can 
avail themselves of the protections Congress has afforded; the provisions, in 
other words, are designed to protect the statute as much, or more than, the 
individuals who are filing clams.162  If an employer were free to intimidate 
or terminate workers for taking advantage of statutory protections, those 
protections would largely become meaningless for the vast majority of 
employees – former employees, on the other hand, would likely still be 
willing to pursue claims since they would have no fear of workplace 
repercussions.  But the message behind the strong protection against 
retaliation is that employees must file complaints, and must do so in a 
timely manner.  In other words, employees are responsible for bringing the 
complaints to their employer’s attention and they will have no excuse if 
they fail to do so since the Court has made it clear that it will protect those 
who file complaints.   
 
 This emphasis on filing complaints has had its greatest effect – and 
it might be said come home to roost -- in the area of sexual harassment law 
where the Court crafted an affirmative defense for employers when no 
tangible workplace action was taken against the employee.163  There are two 
elements to the affirmative defense, which is designed to afford employers 
an opportunity to address workplace harassment, and one of those elements 
requires employees to file claims in a timely fashion with some possibility 
of explaining why they failed to take advantage of an employer’s sexual 
harassment policy.164  It is this latter area that courts, particularly lower 
                                                 
161 See CBOCs v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
encompasses retaliation); Thompson v. North American Stainless, 131 S.Ct. 863 (2010) 
(permitting third-party claims).  
162 This is what Professor Richard Moberly has dubbed “the antiretaliation principle.”  
Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE WESTERN RES. 
L. REV. 375 (2010).  For a thoughtful and influential discussion of the concept of retaliation 
see Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18 (2005).   
163  There were two cases decided on the same day in slightly different ways.  See 
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775 (1998).   
164  See Burlington Industries, 524 U.S. at 764-65 (establishing elements of affirmative 
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courts, have enforced strictly, effectively requiring employees to file 
complaints or lose their right to proceed on the claim at all.165   
 
 Retaliation claims are also quintessentially individual claims, the 
right runs to the individual who registers a complaint.  This would be true 
even when an individual filed a claim that included class allegations, unless 
the employer then took retaliatory actions against all class members or 
potential class members but even then the rights at issue would be those of 
individual class members.  There is no concept of a retaliation claim that 
applies generically to a class.           
 
 Nor do retaliation claims raise issues relating to subtle or implicit 
discrimination.  One of the reasons retaliation claims are on the rise, and 
have relatively high success rates, is that the claims tend to be overt in 
nature, hardly ever subtle.  Retaliation claims often turn on timing – an 
individual files a complaint and she is promptly fired, or sent to an inferior 
job. Indeed, many courts draw inferences based solely on the timing of the 
retaliatory acts. 166  It also makes little sense to describe retaliatory acts as 
indirect; those with retaliation on their mind execute their acts deliberately 
and directly.   
 
 c.  The Issue of Comparators. 
 
 If the focus is on the doctrine created by the Supreme Court, the two 
areas noted above – mixed motives and retaliation claims – constitute the 
areas that might be considered doctrinal innovations that are designed to 
address discrimination in the contemporary world, although it should now 
be clear that neither area is designed to address the more subtle or complex 
forms of discrimination that influence employment decisions.  Indeed, one 
of the lasting legacies of the early doctrine is that individual claims of 
discrimination continue to be proved through a process of identifying 
similarly situated employees who were treated differently.  This established 
                                                                                                                            
defense). 
165  For a recent article discussing the way in which lower courts have interpreted the 
affirmative defense see Zev J. Eigen, Nicholas Menillo & David Sherwyn, When Rules Are 
Made to Be Broken, Northwestern Public Law Research paper No. 13-04, available at 
papers.ssrn.com/s013/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2225978. 
166 See. e.g., Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that 
“temporal proximity between protected EEOC activity and adverse action can support an 
inference of causation when the two events are very close in time”).  The Supreme Court 
has cautioned that actions within three or four months will usually not be sufficient to raise 
a causal question based on “mere temporal proximity.”  Clark County Sch. Dist. v. 
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 274 (2001). 
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method is imperfect to be sure as it often is difficult to identify any 
comparators, and some courts apply extremely strict definitions of 
comparably situated employees which often will lead to a failure of an 
individual’s claim because there will be no admissible comparison.167  At 
the same time, this method of proof comports with common conceptions of 
discrimination and the concept of discriminatory treatment – someone is 
treated differently because of a protected category and the way we know 
that is by identifying someone who is similar in all ways but the protected 
characteristic and demonstrating they were not treated the same.  There is 
also, it should be emphasized, nothing about this method of proof that 
would exclude evidence of subtle or complex discrimination since such 
evidence would be relevant to proving differential treatment so long as one 
is willing to identify discrimination amid the complexity of the underlying 
case.  That is, in the end, the real issue – convincing courts and employers 
that discrimination underlies the way someone is treated, and the method of 
comparison can adequately serve that purpose.  In other words, the problem 
is not with the doctrine but with the limited vision of discrimination many 
courts, including the Supreme Court, and jurors bring to the claims.168      
 
 The complicating factor in proving discrimination is that it is 
necessary to draw inferences from ambiguous evidence.  Those who see 
discrimination as playing a minimal role in contemporary society – as being 
the province of a few bad apples so to speak – are unlikely to see 
discrimination among the ambiguity, and will instead look for clear 
evidence of discrimination, evidence that is not likely to be present.  The 
turn to implicit bias was designed to address some of these limitations but 
using the IAT as the vehicle to illustrate the presence of subtle 
discrimination has turned out to be a misstep because it provides a 
presumption of discrimination that is difficult to overcome.  To give one 
example – if one is asked, in the context of the IAT, how one knows that 
discrimination provides the causal explanation for an observed behavior the 
answer is likely to be that we know that decisionmakers harbor implicit 
biases that they are unaware of.  In light of that kind of explanation, there is 
little one can do or say, and that is the problem the IAT has introduced.  In 
contrast, a richer fuller explanation of the complexities of modern 
                                                 
167  For a detailed critique see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 
120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011). 
168  The problem is not unique to courts.  Professor Samuel Sommers and his co-author 
have performed a series of jury studies that have led them to conclude:  “[W]hen laypeople 
think about white racism, they tend to focus on overt, old-fashioned forms.”  Samuel R. 
Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Lay Theories About White Racists: What Constitutes 
Racism (and What Doesn’t), 9 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 117, 131 
(2006).   
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discrimination might offer a bridge to those who are reluctant to see 
discrimination other than in its most blatant forms.                       
 
 2.  Systemic Claims 
 
 If the Supreme Court has reinforced the individual system of claim 
adjudication, it has primarily dismantled the systemic discrimination 
edifice.  By rejecting the statistical proof offered in the Wal-Mart case, and 
treating the City’s actions in Ricci as a form of intentional discrimination, 
the Court has largely turned its back on these systemic discrimination 
claims, and, at present, it is unclear what kind of proof the Supreme Court 
might accept as indicative of discrimination.  It is certainly possible that it 
would be open to a straightforward disparate impact claim but as I have 
noted previously, those claims are both rare and increasingly difficult to 
establish because courts are willing to accept most employer justifications 
for the disparate impact.169     
 
 There is also a deep irony in the Court’s current approach to claims 
of systemic discrimination.  One of the issues that plagued the Walmart 
litigation was that there was no identifiable policy or practice that one could 
point to as the source of the discrimination.170  This is certainly not 
surprising, and the Court’s reference to a policy of non-discrimination is 
likewise wholly unsurprising and arguably entirely disingenuous since 
every company now has a policy of nondiscrimination and has for many 
years.  The irony, however, comes in that if there had been a formal policy, 
say one that requires prior experience as a manager that was causing the 
observed disparities that policy would most likely be challenged under the 
disparate impact theory, unless there was evidence that the policy was 
implemented with a specific intent to favor men.  Given the Court’s lengthy 
assault on the disparate impact theory, it would be highly ironic if systemic 
discrimination could only now be challenged under that theory.     
 
 From the Court’s recent decisions, particularly in Ricci and Wal-
Mart, it is not at all clear what evidence the Supreme Court would accept to 
demonstrate a pattern of systemic discrimination.   One of the more 
                                                 
169  See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?  53 UCLA L. 
REV. 701 (2006).   The number of new disparate impact cases – at least those that are 
litigated, continue to decline, and many of the cases involve claims that arose many years 
before.  See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Chicago, 702 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting 
intervention effort in a case pending for fourteen years); Cleveland Firefighters v. City of 
Cleveland, 669 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2011) (dissolving consent decree in thirty-year case).     
170  See Wal-Mart, 131 at 2553. 
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disturbing aspects of those cases is that in neither case did the Court 
majority even acknowledge the presence of discrimination, or the lengthy 
history of discrimination that had plagued the New Haven fire department.  
On the contrary, the Court seems to accept that the disparate results were 
the product of legitimate nondiscriminatory forces, such as hard work in 
Ricci171 and a general pattern reflecting interests and abilities in the Wal-
Mart case.172  A similar sentiment ran through the Court’s recent decisions 
involving school integration efforts where again, the Court seemed blind to 
the role that discrimination had played in establishing the housing patterns 
the school districts were seeking to address.173  It may be the case that the 
Supreme Court is incapable of seeing discrimination other than in its most 
blatant forms, where, for example, an employer has a specific 
discriminatory policy in place.      
 
Again, the irony in the Court’s position should be apparent:  they 
can see discrimination only in its most blatant forms but everything we 
know about discrimination suggests that contemporary discrimination looks 
very different.  Certainly it cannot be the case that an unambiguous 
discriminatory policy is necessary to establish a pattern of discrimination – 
those cases thankfully are no longer common but they are also the easiest 
kind of claim to prevail on, and surely Title VII is not designed to uproot 
                                                 
171  This is reflected in the Court’s conclusion that, “There is no genuine dispute that 
the examinations were job related and consistent with business necessity, ” even though 
there was no evidence on that issue at all.  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 558  The Court also discussed 
the “high, and justified, expectations of the candidates,” adding, “Many of the candidates 
had studied for months, at considerable and personal expense, and thus the injury caused by 
the City’s reliance on raw racial statistics at the end of the process was all the more 
severe.”  Id. at 594.  Presumably this sentiment applied to all applicants, not just the white 
applicants, and all of the applicants had a reasonable expectation that the test would satisfy 
legal standards, including that it would be job related.           
172 In the Wal-Mart case, the Court emphasized that the company had a “policy” that 
“forbids discrimination,” that was enforced by “penalties for denials of equal employment 
opportunity.”  131 S.Ct. at 2553  This is so obviously irrelevant – every company in the 
country has such policies – that it suggests the Court was going out of its way to avoid 
seeing discrimination.  The Court was also entirely dismissive of the testimony of William 
Bielby, noting that it “doubt[ed]” whether it would satisfy the standards for admitting 
evidence by an expert.  Id. at 2554.  Finally, the Court noted that allowing supervisor 
discretion was a “presumptively reasonable way of doing business.”  Id.  
173  See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 551 U.S. 701 
(2007).  For a discussion of the Court’s blindness to the role discrimination played in 
housing patterns see James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 131, 140-41 (2007) (“But every level of government – local, state, and 
federal – has also played an integral and underappreciated role in fostering residential 
segregation by race and there has never been a concerted effort by courts or legislatures to 
remedy housing discrimination.”).   
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only the most obvious or plain examples of discrimination.  Indeed, in the 
venerable case of McDonnell Douglas v. Green  the Supreme Court 
affirmed the importance of eradicating what it called “subtle” 
discrimination.174   
 
At the same time, it seems clear that the old statistical models of 
proof developed in the 1970s are no longer sufficient to prove 
discrimination.  Those models primarily relied on statistical imbalances in 
the workforce as proof of discrimination (not just evidence but proof) and 
the inferences courts were apt to draw in the era that immediately followed 
decades of intentional discrimination no longer seem appropriate.  One of 
the issues that ought to be addressed is the basic question why statistics 
should constitute proof of an intent to discriminate?  I suspect that, even 
today, the most common response to that question might be because the 
Supreme Court said they could, which while true is an incomplete and 
unsatisfactory answer today.  In the 1970s, the answer was fairly clear:  
stark disparities in the workforce, along with the presence of widespread 
discrimination, suggested that employers continued in their discriminatory 
ways despite the passage of the Civil Rights Act.  Today that answer no 
longer resonates and there is little question that the inferences one can draw 
from statistical workforce imbalances are now diminished.     
 
This is not to suggest that statistics are no longer relevant to proving 
systemic discrimination; on the contrary, statistics will always be an integral 
part of the proof, that is, after all how a pattern is demonstrated.  In 
employment discrimination claims and elsewhere, statistics reveal patterns 
that would not be apparent if the decisions were viewed in isolation.  These 
statistics, however, are no longer sufficient on their own, other than in the 
rare case when the statistical proof is so strong to leave no real doubt but 
that discrimination caused the disparities.  Of course, such definitive proof 
will only be present in the very strongest claims, leaving out the more 
difficult or subtle cases.  In any event, these two circumstances simply 
represent the poles on the discrimination scale – a clear discriminatory 
policy on the one hand and proof of a statistical imbalance on the other, and 
neither substantially advances our understanding of what the Court is likely 
to accept as proof of discrimination. 
 
Building on the Wal-Mart decision, it also seems clear that the 
argument that discretion invested in supervisors invariably leads to 
discrimination no longer holds true, and in fact, it has not been a viable 
                                                 
174 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (“[I]t is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial 
discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”). 
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argument for many years.175  At one time, several lower courts identified 
discretion as a primary vehicle for discrimination and were willing to draw 
a strong inference of discrimination solely based on discretion.176  Today, 
this is simply not plausible.  Discretion is part of most private, and to a 
lesser extent public, employment systems and it would be a serious 
constraint if an employer could be held liable simply for relying on a system 
that might lead to discrimination.   
 
The notion that discretion is not automatically associated with 
discrimination is also consistent with the idea that discrimination has 
receded.  Identifying discretion with discrimination makes sense only if we 
assume that most or many individuals harbor discriminatory impulses but 
that assumption, again, seems misplaced today.  Indeed, this again 
highlights one of the central problems with relying on the IAT to establish 
the pervasive influence of discrimination.  If we all harbor biases that we 
are neither aware of nor can control, we might be apt to see discrimination 
everywhere we look, and a system that is “vulnerable” to discrimination 
because of the presence of discretion, will likely be treated as, in fact, 
discriminatory.  That is a leap, however, that a contemporary court is 
unlikely to make, and I would suggest, should not make.  It simply seems 
implausible to suggest that discrimination explains all statistical workplace 
imbalances, or even all disparities that we observe.   At best, the IAT 
demonstrates that many individuals have a proclivity towards making 
discriminatory snap judgments but that is a long way from showing that 
those individuals did make snap discriminatory judgments in a particular 
circumstance, just as there is a substantial gulf between identifying a system 
as vulnerable to discrimination and one that is discriminatory.  What is 
needed, instead, is a narrative that ties an employer’s actual practices to a 
pattern of discrimination. 
 
As a practical matter, this will lead to cases in which the employer 
either has a demonstrated history of discrimination – much like in the early 
days of Title VII – or there is clear evidence of a culture of discrimination.  
This was true in the series of cases involving the securities industry where 
                                                 
175 The Supreme Court said as much in the mid-1980s.  See Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (“It is true, to be sure, that an employer’s policy of 
leaving promotion decisions to unchecked discretion of lower level supervisors should 
itself raise no inference of discriminatory conduct.”). 
176 See, e.g., Bell v. Bolger, 708 F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (8th Cir. 1983) (“subjective 
promotion procedures are to be closely scrutinized because of their susceptibility to 
discriminatory abuse”); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1046 (10th Cir. 1981) (concluding 
that although subjective decisionmaking is not discriminatory per se “obviously subjective 
decision making provides an opportunity for unlawful discrimination.”).   
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the plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that the companies treated women 
differently and disparagingly.177  Indeed, many of the cases involved 
graphic and extreme examples of sexist behavior, including the trips to  
strip clubs and the appearances of strippers in the office.178  These cases 
also involved statistical presentations but the anecdotal evidence bolstered 
the statistical case.  The recent class action case against Novartis likewise 
included evidence that the company tolerated harassment by doctors on the 
female sales assistants, including one case of rape.179  Again, the plaintiffs 
presented impressive and detailed statistical analyses but the statistics did 
not do all of the work and there was no need to introduce evidence about a 
hypothetical workplace because the real workplace was replete with 
discrimination.  These cases all offered a narrative that provided context for 
why the statistics represented proof of discrimination.     
 
The downside to this emphasis on a culture of discrimination is that 
many cases of actual discrimination will not fit the model and thus go 
unremedied at least through litigation.  This is undeniably unfortunate but it 
is also a litigation reality – litigation is a blunt tool not particularly adept at 
ferreting out complex or subtle claims of discrimination.  The kind of 
discrimination that is often labeled as institutional or systemic in nature, 
where a discriminatory pattern arises as the result of aggregate decisions by 
multiple decisionmakers, may avoid liability even though, if we were to 
collect a group of discrimination experts, they would likely conclude that 
the employer’s practices represent a pattern of discrimination.  There will, it 
seems, generally be a gap between what might be defined as discrimination 
by those who are committed to rooting it out and what the courts will 
consider discrimination.  The first group would likely conclude it is better to 
define discrimination expansively so as to ensure maximum efficacy while 
courts seem to move in the other direction, choosing to underdefine 
                                                 
177  During the 1990s, many, if not most, of the major securities firms were sued for 
sex discrimination.  Most of the cases settled and only a few produced written opinions.  
See, e.g., Martens v. Smith Barney, 1998 WL 1661385 (SDNY 1998) (approving class 
settlement); Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1464 
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (discussing assignment of clients that disadvantaged women).  See also 
Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Highflier to Outcast: A Woman’s Story, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
10, 2002, at C1 (describing one woman’s plight and the industry’s reputation for sex 
discrimination).   
178 Many of the unsavory exploits were captured in SUSAN ANTILLA, TALES FROM THE 
BOOM-BOOM ROOM: WOMEN VS. WALL STREET (2002). 
179 See Velez v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15125945 (SDNY 
2010) (approving settlement of class claims).  The case resulted in widespread publicity.  
See, e.g., Collean McClarty, Breathtaking Novartis Award, A Wake-up Call, BUSINESS 
INSURANCE, May 24, 2010, at 3; Duff Wilson, Novartis Bias Suit to Begin, N.Y. TIMES, 
April 7, 2010, at B1. 
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discrimination, most likely based on a belief that discrimination no longer 
defines social and economic life.                        
 
Litigation, however, is just one tool available to root out systemic 
discrimination.  The federal government can use its spending power to 
ensure that employers are not just hiring in a nondiscriminatory way but 
implementing affirmative action goals.180  This has long been a requirement 
under the federal contracting guidelines, though it is no understatement to 
suggest that the guidelines have typically been seriously neglected.181  Even 
so, eminent sociologist Frank Dobbin has found that those guidelines have 
played an important role in moving employers to diversify their 
workforces.182  Others have suggested carving out a safe harbor from 
liability for those employers who engage in meaningful efforts to address or 
close off discriminatory channels in their hiring or promotion processes.183  
Both of these approaches can lead employers through a soft stick to take 
measures to address inequities in the workforce, and the credible threat of 
litigation can reinforce the importance of self-assessments.           
 
Indeed, it may be that the Supreme Court has been persuaded that 
employers now have strong incentives to diversify their workforces, thus 
reducing the need for litigation to target subtle forms of discrimination.  In 
the affirmative action cases that have recently come before the Court, the 
business community supported the various programs that were at issue and 
were generally seen as having substantial influence on the Court’s decisions 
not to strike down the programs as unconstitutional.184  This is also 
                                                 
180  See Michael Selmi, Remedying Societal Discrimination Through the Spending 
Power, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1575 (2002) (advocating for use of the spending power to address 
societal discrimination) 
181  Under a long-standing Executive Order, federal contractors with contracts in 
excess of $50,000 have affirmative action obligations, a mandate that is enforced by the 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs.  See Executive Order11246, 3 C.F.R. § 
339, and 41 C.F.R. § 60-50-1.  Enforcement of the Executive Order has long been 
considered lax beginning with a conscious effort in the 1980s to minimize the burdens 
placed on contractors.  See Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, The Effects of Compliance 
Reviews and Lawsuits Over Time, 31 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 855 (2006) (noting that 
compliance reviews can be effective enforcement tool but commenting on the decline 
beginning in the 1980s).  A recent government report was critical of the efforts of the 
OFFCP in terms of combating wage discrimination for women.  See U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, Women’s Earnings: Frederal Agencies Should Bette Monitor Their 
Performance in Enforcing Anti-Discrimination Laws, GAO Report – 08-799, at 21-28 
(Aug. 2008).    
182 See FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 38-39 (2009). 
183 See, e.g., Melissa Hart, The Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination: Considering 
Compliance and Liability, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1623 (2007). 
184  In the University of Michigan Law School case, the Supreme Court specifically 
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consistent with the individualistic focus of the Court’s doctrine – 
discrimination is typically perpetrated by rogue actors that, if given a 
chance, the company will discipline or counteract.  The affirmative defense 
that was created to address certain sexual harassment claims proceeds along 
these lines – the employer should have a first opportunity to remedy the 
situation, a defense that suggests a strong belief that it is in the interests of 
employers to address isolated acts of discrimination when they occur.185  
Although there is no particular reason employer self-interests would be seen 
as a substitute for litigation, there is little question that many employers see 
economic benefits to a diversified workplace, including, quite likely a 
reduced threat of litigation.186     
 
The other side of the systemic coin involves disparate impact claims.  
The traditional disparate impact claims challenging the use of written 
examinations have dramatically declined, and properly so.  There is little 
reason to believe these tests are substantively discriminatory and it is also 
not so clear that employers today should be held responsible if the tests 
produce a disparate impact.  Ideally, employers would move away from 
these written examinations given that they typically produce disparate 
results and are not well structured to provide valuable predictive 
information regarding the abilities of the test takers.  Yet, administratively, 
when there are thousands of applicants, written tests will continue to be the 
most efficient means of screening out individuals, even though the 
predictive ability is weak.187  There will still be cases involving the use of 
written tests but increasingly they are likely to focus on those employers 
                                                                                                                            
acknowledged the importance of the military’s need for diverse graduates.  See Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (highlighting the military’s dependence on graduates 
of institutions of higher education for pool of talented officers).  See also Angelo N. 
Ancheta, The School Desegregation Cases and the Uncertain Future of Racial Equality: 
Science an Constitutional Fact Finding in Equal Protection Analysis, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1115, 1134-36 (2008) (discussing influence of amicus briefs in Court’s decisions).   
185  See cases cited note __, supra. 
186 In a recent book, Professor John D. Skrentny, an astute observer of developments  
in civil rights, documents the ways employers have sought to diversify their workplaces 
even when such efforts might be inconsistent with governing legal principles.  See JOHN D. 
SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE 1-
88 (2014).  For an excellent historical look with a particular focus on public 
accommodations and schools see GAVIN WRIGHT, SHARING THE PRIZE: THE ECONOMICS OF 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH (2013).   
187  Even a well-constructed test like the LSAT has a correlation coefficient of .36, 
which roughly explains about 13% of the variance one observes in predicted grades.  The 
correlation coefficient of the LSAT is discussed in Lisa Anthony Stillwell, Susan P. 
Dalessandro & Lynda M. Reese, Predictive Validity of the LSAT: A National Summary of 
the 2009 and 2010 LSAT Correlation Studies (2011). 
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who have a demonstrated history of indifference to the disparate test results.  
Such a history has been at the core of litigation that has targeted the New 
York City fire department’s lengthy history of discriminatory tests, which 
the litigation has sought to treat as involving intentional discrimination.188     
 
There has also been a modest revival of novel claims pursued under 
the disparate impact theory with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission taking a leading role.  These cases have challenged the use of 
credit scores in the employment process, the use of arrest and conviction 
records, and there has also been interest in challenging employers’ practices 
that refuse to hire individuals who are currently unemployed.189  These 
claims all move the disparate impact theory in a different direction and raise 
the issue of whether these practices should be seen as discriminatory or 
require justification.  Should, for example, an employer be required to 
justify the use of credit scores or is that an issue that employers should be 
free to use regardless of the effect on protected groups?  Should an 
                                                 
188 In a lengthy and contentious litigation brought originally by the Bush Justice 
Department the City of New York has been found liable for the use of discriminatory 
written tests in the fire department.  See United States v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 
2d 77 (E.D. N.Y. 2009).  In a subsequent decision the court held the City liable for 
intentional discrimination concluding, “T]he City’s use of written exams with 
discriminatory impacts and little relation to the job of firefighter was not a one-time 
mistake or the product of benign neglect. It was part of a pattern, practice, and policy of 
intentional discrimination against black applicants that has deep historical antecedents and 
uniquely disabling effects.”  United States v. City of New York, 683 F. Supp. 2d 225, 273 
(E.D.N.Y. 2010).  That decision was recently reversed and remanded for trial with 
reassignment to a different judge.  See United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72 (2d 
Cir. 2013).  
189  To date the cases involving credit scores have been unsuccessful, in part because 
the difficulty of determining what the proper measure of disparate impact is, whether the 
focus should be on applicants or a broader labor market measure.  See, e.g. EEOC v. 
Kaplan Higher Learning Educ. Corp., No. 1:10 CV2882, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11722 
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2013) (granting summary judgment to defendants); EEOC v. Freeman, 
No. RWT 09cv2573, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 112368 (D. Md. 2013) (same).  The EEOC has 
also sued BMW and  Dollar General for their use of criminal convictions in the hiring 
process.  See Press Release, EEOC Files Suit Against Two Employers for Use of Criminal 
Background Checks (June 11, 2013), available at http: 
//www/eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-11-13.cfm.  This is not a new issue but it has 
been recently revived in a poor economy where African Americans are more likely to have 
disabling criminal convictions, particularly for relatively minor crimes like drug 
possession.  The leading older case is Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 
1975), a case that invalidated a policy that prohibited hiring anyone with a conviction other 
than a traffic offense.  The EEOC has yet to file a case challenging a policy that excludes 
the unemployed from eligibility to be hired but it has expressed an interest in the area.  See 
Meeting Transcript, EEOC to Examine Treatment of Unemployed Job Seekers (Feb. 16, 
2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-16-11/transcript.cfm. 
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employer who refuses to hire those who are unemployed be required to 
provide a meaningful justification?  One distinct advantage to these 
questions and cases is that they require courts to consider the purpose 
behind the disparate impact theory rather than ritualistically replaying old 
debates.       
 
Another potential area for systemic litigation would involve 
bringing some of the best academic research into discrimination into the 
courtroom.  Over the last two decades, academics have conducted what are 
known as resume studies to test for discrimination in the labor market.  One 
of the most famous of the studies sent out resumes to employers who had 
advertised open positions that were identical in substance other than the 
names of the applicants – some of the resumes included names that were 
identifiably racial while others appeared more neutral and were designed to 
be treated as not racial in character.  The study documented that those with 
identifiably racial names were substantially less likely to receive calls for 
interviews than the resumes with neutral names. 190 Similar studies have 
documented discrimination towards women with children, women applying 
for jobs in elite restaurants, and more recently among women applying for 
positions in academic science labs.191 A number of scholars have advocated 
for the use of testers, or audit studies, as a basis for workplace litigation,192 
and these studies have the distinct advantage that the evidence of 
discrimination is clean rather than complex, though the studies are not 
without their critics.193  Discrimination skeptics may still be reluctant to 
                                                 
190 See Marianne Bertrand & Sandhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More 
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?  A Field Experiment on Labor Market 
Discrimination, 94 AMER. ECON. REV. 991 (2004). 
191 Shelly J. Correll, Stephen Benard, In Paik, Getting A Job: Is There A Motherhood 
Penalty?, 112 AMER. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 1297 (2007) (audit study of employers found 
women discriminated against in job callbacks); David Neumark, Sex Discrimination in 
Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study, 91 Q. J. OF ECON. 915 (1996) (finding women were 
discriminated against in fine dining restaurant hiring);  Corinne A. Moss-Racusin et al., 
Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students, PNAS Early Edition (2012), 
available at http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/09/14/1211286109.full.pdf+html 
(finding both male and female scientists discriminated against women students applying for 
lab jobs).  
192  See Devah Pager, The Use of Field Experiments for Employment Discrimination: 
Contributions, Critiques and Directions for the Future, 609 ANNALS OF AMER. ACADEMY 
OF POL. & SOC. SCIENCE 104, 114 (2007) (noting that the studies “come to the conclusion 
that race has large effects on employment opportunities with a black job seeker anywhere 
between 50 and 500 percent less likely to be considered by employers as an equally 
qualified white applicant.”);  Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling An Enforcement Void: Using 
Testers to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Low-Skilled Entry-Level 
Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 403 (1993). 
193 See, e.g., James Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
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attribute discrimination in these audit studies because an inference of 
discrimination will still need to be drawn but they represent an innovative 
way to address contemporary discrimination that works in subtle ways, and 
they also can move the focus beyond individual actors to the company and 
possibly even an entire industry.  Similarly, the EEOC efforts at challenging 
the use of credit scores, arrest and conviction records and prohibitions on 
hiring the unemployed bring new issues and new questions to the forefront, 
issues and questions that can help redefine discrimination for the next 
generation. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Employment discrimination law was ripe for updating and the 
Supreme Court was right to resist efforts to mindlessly apply the old case 
law to define discrimination in the contemporary workplace.  We can do 
better but the Supreme Court can also do better by coming to terms with the 
way discrimination has changed, rather than concentrating on how 
discrimination has declined.  What that will mean for the future is hard to 
know but what is needed is a deeper education regarding the complex ways 
discrimination continues to influence labor market outcomes.  It is not yet 
time to forego litigation that is designed to uncover either systemic 
discrimination that is the product of many decisions and influences, nor is it 
time to turn a blind eye to how subtle discrimination emerges in individual 
cases.  Implicit bias will be one part of that educational mission but it is also 
important to accept the limits of that concept and instead focus on what 
steps individuals and employers can take to keep whatever hidden biases 
might exist in check.  It is a time to reset the doctrine by foregoing the old 
models of proof in favor of identifying new claims, new narratives that will 
better capture the complexities of modern discrimination.            
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